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SUMMARY
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has played a fundamental role 
in regulating and supporting UK agriculture since the UK joined the then 
European Economic Community. It has helped in facilitating free trade in agri-
food products within the EU Single Market, while many farmers in the UK—
particularly hill farmers—rely on CAP funding to sustain their businesses. 
Wider rural communities also benefit from agri-environment schemes, rural 
investment and the sustained agricultural production in often remote areas.
Yet the CAP has often been criticised by the industry for being bureaucratic and 
burdensome, and some believe CAP financial support has been misdirected 
and ineffective. Brexit thus presents a real opportunity for the UK to review 
and adopt a policy for food and farming which regulates and supports the 
agricultural sector effectively, and which is tailored to the UK’s unique farming 
landscape. However, farmers across the UK will also need time and clarity from 
Government to make the transition to a new regulatory framework and a new 
funding system after Brexit.
Agri-food products are traded extensively. EU membership currently provides 
the framework for the UK’s trade in agri-food products not just within the 
EU, but with third countries with which the EU has negotiated preferential 
trade agreements. Once outside the EU the UK must develop its own external 
tariffs, and may find itself subject to the high external tariffs applied by the 
EU to agricultural products—to the detriment of UK farmers and food 
manufacturers—unless a preferential trade agreement is agreed. The UK may 
also face non-tariff barriers when exporting agriculture and food products to 
the EU, resulting in delays at ports and additional administrative costs. Both 
tariff and non-tariff barriers could disrupt integrated supply chains between 
the UK and the EU, and pose a particular challenge for the agri-food sector in 
Northern Ireland.
As it negotiates new trading relations with the EU and the wider world the 
Government will need to balance complex interests. It will need to secure a 
fair deal for farmers and maintain high standards for agricultural products in 
the UK, including farm animal welfare, while delivering affordable food to 
consumers and complying with WTO rules.
The Government is currently giving mixed messages to the agricultural sector. 
Its vision for the UK as a leading free-trade nation with low tariff barriers to the 
outside world does not sit easily with its declared commitment to high quality 
and welfare standards in the UK farming sector. Combining and delivering 
these two objectives will be a considerable challenge.
Agricultural policy therefore cannot be seen in isolation from trade. The 
terms of future free trade agreements will affect or limit domestic policies on 
regulation, funding and farming standards, while those policies may in turn 
determine which countries UK products can be sold to.
Agricultural policy is a devolved competence, and the Government will need to 
engage extensively with the devolved administrations to ensure the repatriation 
of agricultural policy from the EU respects the devolution settlements without 
compromising the integrity of the UK’s internal market in agri-food products.
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The UK’s agri-food sector relies extensively on other EU countries for both 
permanent and seasonal labour. This labour ranges from skilled professionals 
(such as veterinarians) to labourers who may be viewed as unskilled, but are 
in fact skilled at sector-specific tasks (such as abattoir workers and fruit and 
vegetable pickers). Without access to this labour resource, both the agricultural 
sector and food manufacturers will face severe difficulties. This is an immediate 
challenge, which the Government must address urgently as the UK approaches 
withdrawal.
Doubts over whether the UK can negotiate the Government’s envisioned trading 
relations with the EU have been widely rehearsed—by the agricultural sector 
among others. Farmers risk high tariffs and non-tariff barriers on exports, 
which would render their business uncompetitive, while simultaneously having 
to adjust to a new UK policy for funding. This could have detrimental effects 
on an industry—and rural communities—which needs long-term clarity and 
policy stability to adjust to the post-Brexit policy environment. Transitional 
arrangements will be critical to the long-term success of UK farming.

Brexit: agriculture
ChAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Agriculture and food in the UK
1. Primary agricultural production is the first step in a long and integrated 
agri-food supply chain in the UK and the EU. Across England, Northern 
Ireland, Scotland and Wales the agricultural sector—from arable crops to 
dairy, livestock and horticulture—plays an important role in supplying food 
to UK citizens.1 It also supplies foreign markets, maintains rural communities 
in the UK and manages the natural environment.2
2. Taken as a whole, the agri-food sector3 accounted for 7.2% of the national 
Gross Value Added (GVA) in 2014, or £108 billion in total, within which 
agriculture accounted for £9.9 billion.4 Also in 2014, the agricultural 
workforce consisted of some 429,000 people,5 and the utilised agricultural 
area (UAA)6 equalled some 71% of land in the UK.7
3. The food manufacturing industry is also an inherent part of the UK agri-
food sector. It accounted for £26.9 billion of GVA in 2014 and employed 
some 381,000 people.8
Agriculture and Brexit
4. Since the UK’s accession to the European Economic Community in 1973, 
the EU has had a fundamental impact on UK agriculture through the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The CAP is the system of financial 
support measures and programmes under which farmers in the UK and the 
rest of the EU work. The CAP covers areas such as farming, environmental 
measures and rural development. It also regulates the organisation of EU 
agricultural markets.9 EU policies also govern the trade arrangements 
1  The United Kingdom is 61% self-sufficient in all foods. Q 43 (Wesley Aston)
2  Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, Agriculture in the United Kingdom 2015 (2016), 
p 97: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/557993/AUK–
2015–05oct16.pdf [accessed 19 April 2017]
3  This includes agriculture, food manufacturing, food wholesaling, food retailing and food non-
residential catering. In this report, we only consider agriculture and food manufacturing.
4  Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, Agriculture in the United Kingdom 2015 (2016), 
p 97: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/557993/AUK–
2015–05oct16.pdf [accessed 19 April 2017]
5  Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, Agriculture in the United Kingdom 2015 (2016), 
p 97: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/557993/AUK–
2015–05oct16.pdf [accessed 19 April 2017]
6  The UAA is made up of arable and horticultural crops, uncropped arable land, common rough grazing, 
temporary and permanent grassland and land used for outdoor pigs. It does not include woodland and 
other non-agricultural land. Defra, Agriculture in the United Kingdom 2015, (2016), p 10. We do not 
consider forestry in this report, though we recognise the importance of the sector. 
7  Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, Agriculture in the United Kingdom 2015 (2016), 
p 5: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/557993/AUK–
2015–05oct16.pdf [accessed 19 April 2017]
8  This figure includes employees involved in “everything from primary processing (milling, malting, 
slaughtering to complex prepared foods.” Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 
Agriculture in the United Kingdom 2015 (2016), pp 97–8: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/557993/AUK–2015–05oct16.pdf [accessed 19 April 2017]
9  HM Government, Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European 
Union: Agriculture (2014), p 19: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/335026/agriculture–final–report.pdf [accessed 19 April 2017]
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between the UK and the rest of the EU and third parties, and thanks to 
the free movement of labour, the agri-food sector in the UK employs a high 
number of EU nationals.
5. In withdrawing from the EU the UK will withdraw from the CAP. Though 
in the first instance many elements of the CAP may be carried over into 
domestic law by the Great Repeal Bill,10 Brexit presents the UK with an 
opportunity to fundamentally review the objectives and design of its long-
term agricultural policy. At the same time, the UK agri-food industry trades 
major volumes of agri-food products, predominately with the EU, under the 
auspices of the Single Market.11 The Prime Minister intends that the UK 
will leave the Single Market, but has set out her wish to negotiate in its place 
a comprehensive free trade agreement and a bespoke customs agreement 
between the UK and the EU.12
This inquiry
6. This inquiry, one of a series of Brexit-related inquiries conducted by the 
EU Committee and its six sub-committees since the June 2016 referendum, 
considers key issues for agriculture and food that the Government will need 
to address before or immediately after the UK withdraws from the EU. The 
purpose of this report is to highlight the key challenges and opportunities 
that Brexit affords those sectors. These relate to the trading arrangements 
that will govern the UK’s agri-food trade after Brexit, the agricultural 
regulatory framework, the future of funding for the agricultural sector and 
access to labour.
7. In its entirety, the agri-food sector ranges from the primary production of 
agricultural commodities to the catering and retail outlets selling the final 
processed or unprocessed food to consumers. It is beyond the scope of this 
report to address the implications of Brexit on that entire supply chain. 
Instead our emphasis is on the primary production and the agricultural 
sector that underpins it, considering the associated food manufacturing 
sector as and when relevant.13
8. We acknowledge that agriculture and the environment are strongly inter-
dependent. We address the environment to some extent in this report, 
particularly with regards to funding in Chapter 5; however, we do not explore 
10  In October 2016, Prime Minister the Rt Hon Theresa May MP announced the Government’s intention 
to introduce a Great Repeal Bill. It will repeal the European Communities Act 1972, which makes 
EU laws part of the UK legal system, and will convert existing EU law into domestic law, wherever 
practical. The aim of the Bill is to ensure a “calm and orderly” exit from the EU.
11  Annual exports of food and non-alcoholic drinks (including manufactured goods and processed and 
unprocessed ingredients) were worth £12.3 billion in 2015. Imports of food and non-alcoholic drinks 
amounted to £35.1 billion in the same period. Food and Drink Federation (FDF), ‘UK-EU food 
and drink statistics’: https://www.fdf.org.uk/eureferendum–food–drink–statistics.aspx [accessed 24 
April 2017] The broader category of food, feed and drink exports from the UK in 2015 was £18.0 
billion, while the value of imports was £38.5 billion in the same year. Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs, Agriculture in the United Kingdom 2015, (May 2016), p 84: https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/557993/AUK–2015–05oct16.pdf [accessed 
20 April 2017].
12  Prime Minister Theresa May, Speech on the Government’s negotiating objectives for exiting the EU, 
17 January 2017: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the–governments–negotiating–objectives–
for–exiting–the–eu–pm–speech [accessed 20 April 2017]
13  Trade in food and beverages were substantively considered in our report Brexit: trade in goods (European 
Union Committee, Brexit: trade in goods (16th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 129))
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future environment policy in detail. We considered the impact of Brexit on 
environment policy in our report Brexit: environment and climate change.14
9. The EU Energy and Environment Sub-Committee, whose members are 
listed in Appendix 1, met in January, February and March 2017 to take 
evidence from the witnesses listed in Appendix 2. The Committee is grateful 
for their participation in this inquiry. We also thank our Specialist Adviser, 
Professor Fiona Smith of the University of Warwick.
10. We make this report to the House for debate.
14  European Union Committee, Brexit: environment and climate change (12th Report, Session 2016–17, 
HL Paper 109)
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ChAPTER 2: WIThDRAWING FROM ThE COMMON 
AGRICULTURAL POLICY
The development of the Common Agricultural Policy
11. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was established in 1962. The 
original purpose of the CAP was to encourage better productivity in the food 
chain in the years following World War II, thereby providing a fair standard 
of living for the agricultural community, stabilising the market and ensuring 
the availability of food to European consumers at reasonable prices.15
12. Initially, the CAP offered high support prices to farmers, combined with 
border protection and export support to incentivise production. Yet by the 
1980s the EU had permanent surpluses in many farm products, resulting in 
the so-called ‘butter mountains’ and ‘wine lakes’, and the CAP accounted 
for well over half of the Community budget.16 Subsequent reforms have 
aimed to bring down the cost of the CAP and shift the policy away from 
production support (through market interventions such as price support and 
border tariffs) towards income support decoupled from production.17 The 
most recent reform, which covered the period 2014–2020, followed this 
trend.
13. In its 2014 Balance of Competences review, the Government found that, 
notwithstanding numerous reforms, the objectives of the CAP “remained 
unclear”. Most respondents saw the CAP as “misdirected, cumbersome, 
costly and bureaucratic”.18
14. In order to facilitate the functioning of the Single Market in agricultural 
products, the EU also sets standards for food, farm animal health and welfare 
and plant protection products—what the Commission calls “coherent farm-
to-table” measures.19 This regulatory framework also governs genetically 
modified organisms (GMO),20 organic farming, plants and plant products,21 
and the marketing of seeds and plant reproductive materials.22 The EU 
also provides a pan-European regulatory framework for plant protection 
15  European Commission, ‘The history of the common agricultural policy’, (April 2017): https://
ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap–overview/history_en [accessed 26 April 2017]
16  Oral evidence taken on 9 December 2015 (Session 2015–16), Q 8 (Prof Wyn Morgan)
17  European Commission, Overview of CAP Reform 2014–2020, Agricultural Policy Perspectives Brief, 
No 5 (December 2013) 
18  HM Government, Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European 
Union: Agriculture (2014) pp 5–8: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/335026/agriculture–final–report.pdf [accessed 19 April 2017]
19  European Commission, ‘Food safety: overview’, (April 2017): http://ec.europa.eu/food/overview_en 
[accessed 27 April 2017]
20  House of Commons Library, Brexit: impact across policy areas, Briefing Paper 07213, August 2016, 
p 52
21  This body of legislation prevents the introduction into the EU, or the spread throughout the EU, of 
harmful organisms. Council Directive 2000/29/EC of 8 May 2000 on protective measures against the 
introduction into the Community of organisms harmful to plants or plant products and against their 
spread within the Community OJ L 169 (10 July 2000) will be repealed and replaced by Regulation 
2016/2031 of 26 October 2016 on protective measures against pests of plants OJ L 317/4 (23 November 
2016) on 14 December 2019. 
22  Seed imported into the EU from third countries must meet equivalent standards to be accepted into 
the EU market. European Commission, ‘Equivalence requirements for non-EU countries’ (April 
2017): http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/plant_propagation_material/equivalence_requirements_non–
eu_en [accessed 20 April 2017]
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products (pesticides),23 and EU rules regulate the maximum level of traces 
of pesticides (‘residue’) allowed in food or feed.24
15. Most of the EU rules covering animal health and welfare are made under 
Article 43 TFEU;25 to the extent that the rules relate to the Single Market, 
animal health and welfare are regulated under Article 114 TFEU,26 the aim of 
which is to facilitate the common market in agricultural goods by enhancing 
food safety, harmonising standards27 and minimising the spread of diseases.28 
Many of these areas are underpinned by international standards.29
An opportunity for change
16. Brexit represents an opportunity to review and redesign the UK’s policy for 
food and farming. In the words of George Dunn, Chief Executive of the 
Tenant Farmers Association (TFA):
“There is now the opportunity to put together a broad agricultural and 
environmental policy that fits our circumstances better than we have 
had previously. Connected with that, there is the opportunity now to 
build a new consensus, not just within the farming community but with 
the animal health and welfare agenda, the environmental agenda and 
our place in the world in terms of aid and trade.”30
The Food Research Collaboration likewise told us: “Brexit creates a space 
to ‘do food differently,’ to create new policies and systems to address the 
failings of the current food system.”31
17. The Minister of State for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, George Eustice 
MP, agreed: “For me the greatest opportunity that we have in leaving the 
EU is to design a better, more coherent domestic policy to support farmers to 
become more profitable, to support environmental outcomes and to promote 
things such as animal welfare. That is the real prize, the real gain, if you 
like.”32
23  Before any plant protection product can be placed on the market or used, it must be authorised in 
the Member State(s) concerned. Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of 21 October 2009 concerning the 
placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directive 79/117/EEC and 
91/414/EEC OJ L 309/1 (24 November 2009) lays down the rules and procedures for authorisation of 
such products. European Commission, Authorisation of Plant Protection Products (April 2017): http://
ec.europa.eu/food/plant/pesticides/authorisation_of_ppp_en [accessed 20 April 2017]
24  European Commission, ‘Maximum Residue Levels’, (April 2017): http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/
pesticides/max_residue_levels_en [accessed 20 April 2017]
25  The EU has legislated to set minimum animal welfare standards, though Member States may maintain 
stricter rules if they are compatible with the provisions of the Treaty. Article 13 TFEU also recognises 
animals as sentient beings. European Commission, ‘Animal welfare’, (April 2017): http://ec.europa.
eu/food/animals/welfare_en [accessed 20 April 2017]
26  HM Government Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European 
Union: Animal Health and Welfare and Food Safety (2013), p 12: https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/227367/DEF–PB13979–BalOfComp–HMG–WEB.
PDF [accessed 20 April 2017]
27  The UK maintains stricter rules on slaughter and animal welfare broadly. House of Commons Library, 
Brexit: impact across policy areas, Briefing Paper 07213, August 2016, p 64
28  European Commission, ‘The EU Animal Health Law’, (April 2017): http://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/
health/regulation_en [accessed 20 April 2017]
29  House of Commons Library, Brexit: impact across policy areas, Briefing Paper 07213, August 2016, 
p 64
30  Q 12
31  Written evidence from Food Research Collaboration (ABR0024)
32  Q 84
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Immediate challenges
18. Though the repatriation of agricultural policy from the EU presents the UK 
Government with an opportunity to develop a new, long-term approach to 
food and farming, the focus of this report is on the immediate challenges 
facing UK agriculture in the approach to Brexit.
19. Guy Smith, Vice President of the NFU, suggested that these challenges 
could “conceptually” be divided up “between trade, labour and policy or 
support”.33 NFU Scotland similarly highlighted “trade, the movement of 
labour and support” as key issues.34 Wesley Aston, Chief Executive of the 
Ulster Farmers’ Union, argued that “The main critical policy decision is 
around trade. It is only when we figure out what actual trade agreements we 
reach in terms of import and export standards that we are then in a position 
to fully understand what we do on our support levels and the format of that 
support.”35
20. From a food manufacturing point of view, Ian Wright, Director General of 
the Food and Drink Federation (FDF), also believed that “the three key 
parts of the Brexit decision that are most challenging are the labour market, 
the regulatory framework and the future of tariffs and trade”.36
Conclusions and recommendations
21. Leaving the Common Agricultural Policy and the European Union 
will have fundamental implications for the agricultural sector in the 
UK. In the long term the UK has an opportunity to review and improve 
its agriculture, environment, and food policy, better meeting the 
needs of the agriculture sector, the environment and consumers. But 
in the short term, the Government will need to work closely with the 
industry to help it respond to critical challenges: forging new trading 
arrangements with the EU and the rest of the world; providing 
regulatory stability and clarity; addressing the future of funding for 
the agricultural sector; and ensuring access to labour.
33  Q 43
34  Written evidence from NFU Scotland (ABR0007)
35  Q 44
36  Q 51
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ChAPTER 3: FUTURE TRADE IN AGRI-FOOD PRODUCTS
Agri-food trade in the EU
22. The EU is the UK’s single largest trading partner in agri-food products. 
Peter Hardwick, Head of Exports at the Agriculture and Horticulture 
Development Board (AHDB), told us: “If we look at our agricultural exports, 
they are currently very dependent on trade with the European Union and, 
on average, about 80% of our agricultural exports go to the European 
Union.”37 The FDF, representing food manufacturers and processers in the 
UK, also told us that “the overwhelming majority of trade (over 70 per cent 
of exports and vital imports) is with EU member states—and 94 per cent of 
imports and 97 per cent of exports are with countries with which the EU has 
negotiated an FTA”.38
23. The value of food, feed and drink exports from the UK in 2015 was £18.0 
billion, while the value of imports was £38.5 billion.39 These figures include 
a wide range of products from raw agricultural commodities through lightly 
processed to highly processed products.40 When only food and non-alcoholic 
beverages are considered,41 exports were worth £12.3 billion while imports 
amounted to £35.1 billion in 2015.42 Regardless of the combination of 
products considered, the UK is a net importer of food.43
24. Illustrating the significance of the EU market to UK agriculture, figure 1 
sets out imports and exports of eight key agricultural commodities to and 
from the EU as a percentage of the total import and export of those goods.
Figure 1: Trade with the EU as percentage of total trade for key 
agricultural commodities
0%
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meat
Oilseeds Potatoes Cereals Beef Poultry Dairy Pig meat
Imports form the EU as % of total imports Exports to the EU as % of total exports
Source: Agriculture & Horticulture Development Board, Brexit: implications for agriculture and trade (January 
2017): http://www.ahdb.org.uk/brexit/documents/SAOSBrexit26Jan17.pdf [accessed 21 April 2017]
37  Q 51
38  Supplementary written evidence from Food and Drink Federation (ABR0044)
39  Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Agriculture in the United Kingdom 2015, (May 
2016), p 84: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/557993/
AUK–2015–05oct16.pdf [accessed 20 April 2017]. These figures are for a wider sector than was 
considered by our recent report Brexit: trade in goods, which considered food and non-alcoholic 
beverages only.
40  Examples of lightly processed foods are meat, cheese and butter, powdered milk, flour and sugar. 
Highly processed products include confectionery, canned meats, jams, alcoholic drinks and ice cream.
41  This includes manufactured goods and processed and unprocessed ingredients.
42  Food and Drink Federation, ‘UK-EU food and drink statistics’, (July 2016): https://www.fdf.org.uk/
eu–referendum–food–drink–statistics.aspx [accessed 24 April 2017]
43  Supplementary written evidence from NFU (ABR0042)
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New trading relations
25. The free movement of agri-food products between the UK and the EU, 
and within the EU, is governed by the customs union component of the 
Single Market.44 Under the customs union Member States have adopted a 
Common External Tariff that is applied to goods imported from outside the 
Union.45 Imported agricultural and food products also need to comply with 
EU standards and regulations for product safety, which are checked at the 
EU’s external border posts. Goods that comply with import formalities may 
circulate freely in the EU.46
26. On 17 January 2017 the Prime Minister announced the Government’s 
intention to “pursue a bold and ambitious Free Trade Agreement with the 
European Union … [to] allow for the freest possible trade in goods and 
services between Britain and the EU’s Member States”.47 This intention was 
reiterated in the Government’s White Paper, The United Kingdom’s exit from 
and partnership with the EU, published in February 2017, and forms the basis 
of the Prime Minister’s letter of 29 March, formally notifying the European 
Council of the UK’s intention to withdraw from the EU. As a result, the UK 
will cease to be a member of the Single Market and customs union.
27. In this chapter we explore the implications of new trading relations for the 
UK agri-food sector only. For a detailed analysis of free trade agreements 
and trading on World Trade Organization (WTO) terms in general, we refer 
readers to our report Brexit: the options for trade.48 For a detailed analysis of 
trade in goods, we refer to our report Brexit: trade in goods.49
World Trade Organization and agriculture
28. In the absence of the UK-EU free trade agreement set out by the Prime 
Minister, the UK and EU would trade under the default framework for trade 
governed by the World Trade Organization (WTO).50 The UK is a member 
of the WTO in its own right—though the EU represents Member States at 
the WTO—and is bound by its rules. The WTO Agreement on Agriculture 
(AoA) provides the multilateral rules on international trade and domestic 
support for agriculture.51
29. WTO membership consists of a balance of negotiated ‘rights’, such as the 
right to be able to export to other countries, and ‘obligations’, for example 
44  A ‘customs union’ refers to an agreement between countries to remove tariffs and restrictions on 
the movement of goods within their borders, and to agree a common external tariff for all goods 
imported from countries outside their borders. European Union Committee, Brexit: the options for 
trade (5th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 72), para 20
45  European Union Committee, Brexit: the options for trade (5th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 72), 
para 12 and Article 3(1)(e) and Article 207 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 
326 (consolidated version of 26 October 2012).
46  Goods imported into the EU also need to follow ‘rules of origin’, which determine where a product 
and its components were produced in order to ensure that the correct customs duty is levied. European 
Union Committee, Brexit: trade in goods (16th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 129), p 28
47  Prime Minister Theresa May, Speech on the Government’s negotiating objectives for exiting the EU, 
17 January 2017: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the–governments–negotiating–objectives–
for–exiting–the–eu–pm–speech [accessed 20 April 2017]
48  European Union Committee, Brexit: the options for trade (5th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 72)
49  European Union Committee, Brexit: trade in goods (16th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 129)
50  The WTO has 164 member countries, which together account for 95% of world trade. European 
Union Committee, Brexit: the options for trade (5th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 72), p 51
51  HM Government, Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European 
Union: Agriculture (2014), p 17: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/335026/agriculture–final–report.pdf [accessed 19 April 2017]
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to limit restrictions on imports. Both rights and obligations work through 
rules which apply to all members of the WTO, as well as country-specific 
commitments known as ‘schedules of concessions’ or ‘schedules’.52 Schedules 
include:
• Maximum tariff levels for agricultural products, which are often 
referred to as ‘bound tariffs’ or ‘bindings’;
• Tariff rate quotas, which allow a quantity of products to be imported 
at a lower tariff (or tariff-free), after which the bound tariff rates apply; 
and
• Commitments on the levels of domestic support and export competition 
for agricultural products.53
The UK’s new WTO schedules of concessions
30. In our report Brexit: the options for trade we noted that, in withdrawing from 
the EU, the UK would have to separate its WTO schedules from those of 
the EU.54 Alan Matthews, Professor Emeritus of Agricultural Economics 
at Trinity College Dublin, agreed that without the establishment of UK 
schedules at the WTO, “It is very difficult to see how you can proceed to 
negotiate either with the European Union or with third countries.”55
31. The UK’s schedules will have to contain commitments reflecting the 
Agreement on Agriculture, namely market access (tariffs and tariff rate 
quotas), domestic support and export competition (subsidies).56 Professor 
Joseph McMahon, Dean of the Sunderland School of Law at University 
College Dublin, noted that such commitments would be a pre-condition of 
any free trade agreement:
“Trade negotiations are about a range of issues, for example, trade 
concessions on tariffs, tariff quotas, the use of export subsidies and 
regulatory issues. Negotiations on trade concessions are conducted with 
respect to a Schedule, so logically this would suggest that a proposed 
Schedule should be in place before the negotiations begin.”57
52  European Union Committee, Brexit: the options for trade (5th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 72), 
p 52
53  Export competition, that is export support, has been reduced over time. World Trade Organization, 
Legal texts: the WTO agreements (2017): https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.
htm#aAgreement [accessed 20 April 2017]
54  European Union Committee, Brexit: the options for trade (5th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 72), 
para 172
55  Q 32
56  Articles 3 and 4, World Trade Organization, Agreement on Agriculture (2017): https://www.wto.org/
english/docs_e/legal_e/14–ag_01_e.htm#articleIII [accessed 20 April 2014]
57  Supplementary written evidence from Prof Joseph McMahon (ABR0039)
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Tariff barriers
32. Tariffs impose a charge on the import of a product, usually expressed as a 
percentage of the value of the product,58 with the percentage varying from 
product to product.59 In so doing, a tariff raises the price of the imported 
product.
Box 1: Tariffs and the WTO
WTO members commit not to raise tariffs beyond a certain maximum level 
(referred to as ‘bound tariff rates’).60 These commitments vary from member to 
member, and between product categories. They are contained in each member’s 
schedules of concessions. According to the most favoured nation (MFN) 
obligation, members cannot normally discriminate between their trading 
partners. If a WTO member grants a concession (such as a lower tariff) to one 
member, then it must also do the same for all other WTO members.61
There are limited exceptions to this obligation not to discriminate between 
WTO members, including forming a customs union,62 negotiating a free trade 
agreement,63 and giving preferential treatment to developing countries. 
60 61 62 63
Source: European Union Committee, Brexit: trade in goods (16th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 129), 
pp 29–30
33. Though tariffs have generally been reduced through successive negotiations, 
EU agricultural markets remain protected by relatively high tariffs. For 
example, EU average MFN tariffs on dairy products are 54%, on sugar 31% 
and on cereals 22%.64 Figure 2 illustrates the levels of tariffs on agri-food 
products compared to other products.
58  Known as an ad valorem tariff. World Bank, ‘Forms of Import Tariffs’ (2010): http://wits.worldbank.
org/WITS/WITS/WITSHELP/Content/Data_Retrieval/P/Intro/C2.Forms_of_Import_Tariffs.htm 
[accessed 20 April 2017]
59  Most countries use a nomenclature comprising about 5000 commodity groups to list the different 
products. The nomenclature is referred to as the Harmonised System and is maintained by the World 
Customs Organization.
60  Members of the WTO provide information regarding their bound tariffs in their goods schedules. 
However, they are able to provide more favourable applied tariffs if this is done on an MFN basis.
61  World Trade Organization, ‘Principles of the trading system’ (2017): https://www.wto.org/English/
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm#seebox [accessed 20 April 2017]
62  WTO members can form a customs union. The EU is an example of this. There are no tariffs on 
products traded between the EU Member States and its Common Customs Tariff applies to all goods 
imported from third countries. European Union Committee, Brexit: the options for trade (5th Report, 
Session 2016–17, HL Paper 72)
63  WTO members can negotiate an FTA. In the case of the EU, this includes third country FTAs 
(such as that between the EU and South Korea), Switzerland’s bilateral agreements with the EU, 
and the European Economic Area (which brings together the EU Member States, Norway, Iceland 
and Liechtenstein). Article xxIV: 8: World Trade Organisation, General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994, (2017): https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_09_e.
htm [accessed 20 April 2017]. We note that the European Economic Area is treated as a free trade 
agreement under WTO rules.
64  HM Government, Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European 
Union: Trade and Investment (February 2014), p 45: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/279322/bis_14_591_balance_of_competences_review_Trade_and_
investment_government_response_to_the_call_for_evidence.pdf [accessed 21 April 2017]
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Figure 2: Average final bound tariff rates applied by the EU by broad 
category of goods
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Source: European Union Committee, Brexit: the options for trade (5th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 72), 
p 58
34. Lord Price CVO, Minister of State for Trade Policy, Department for 
International Trade, told the External Affairs Sub-Committee that the 
Government was “looking to replicate as far as possible the current UK 
agreements within a new WTO schedule. In that sense, we are not looking 
to deviate from what we do today.”65 We therefore assume that the UK will 
retain, at least in the short term, the EU’s tariff schedules.
35. But despite the Government’s intention to preserve the EU’s external tariffs 
after Brexit, the External Affairs Sub-Committee heard that there could be 
pressure from both within the UK and from third countries for the UK to 
change its levels of tariffs and tariff rate quotas.66
36. This was borne out by evidence given by the Rt Hon Lord Forsyth of 
Drumlean, former Secretary of State for Scotland, to the European Union 
Select Committee in March: “Leaving the EU’s Internal Market (the Single 
Market) and the associated Customs Union offers the opportunities to 
reduce considerably the cost of living through access to lower-priced foods”.67 
The Rt Hon Owen Paterson MP made a similar point in his recent paper UK 
agricultural policy post-Brexit:
“Leaving the European Union and its Customs Union is a precondition 
for the UK to become a leader in global free trade, boosting our exports 
and lowering prices for all consumers. It is estimated that prices will 
65  Oral evidence taken before the EU External Affairs Sub-Committee, 8 February 2017 (Session 2016–
17), Q 122 
66  European Union Committee, Brexit: trade in goods (16th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 129), 
para 122
67  Written evidence submitted to the European Union Committee, 4 March 2017 (Session 2016–17), 
DEV0019 (Lord Forsyth of Drumlean) 
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be reduced overall by around 8%, with the price of food dropping by 
around 10%.”68
In a similar vein, Ryan Bourne, Head of Public Policy at the Institute for 
Economic Affairs (IEA), set out a tariff-liberalisation vision for food and 
farming in his IEA blog: “Brexit gives us the opportunity to rid ourselves 
of this blatant protectionism, to the benefit of our consumers.” By applying 
lower tariffs—or abolishing tariffs altogether—UK consumers could 
experience “lower prices in our shops directly”.69
37. In evidence to this inquiry, Alan Swinbank, Emeritus Professor of Agricultural 
Economics at the University of Reading, told us that the UK could “open 
up our markets and have much cheaper imports coming into Britain”, which 
could put “some downward pressure upon food prices”.70 Which? also said 
that there was “a possibility that trade deals may open the market to cheaper 
products, which could help keep prices lower more generally” though they 
cautioned that “this should be delivered without reducing standards.”71 We 
return to the issue of standards below.
38. We therefore acknowledge the argument that a low-tariff open-market policy 
could deliver the benefit of lower food prices for consumers.
39. Yet we also acknowledge the views of some witnesses, who were concerned 
that such a liberalisation of tariffs would damage the agricultural sector in 
the UK. The NFU told us: “A potential unilateral lowering of British tariffs 
would be damaging”, and added that “many UK farm businesses would be 
put at significant competitive disadvantage if current tariff barriers were 
removed or slashed without great care being taken to ensure a level playing 
field”.72 NFU Scotland agreed: “Any Brexit outcome that results in the UK 
importing cheaper food would be hugely damaging to the farming, food and 
drinks sectors of Scotland and the UK.”73
40. The high tariffs on agricultural goods have, we heard, offered a degree of 
protection from non-EU countries. The National Pig Association explained:
“The level of protection afforded to the EU pig sector by import tariffs is 
significant … With pig production costs in the USA, Canada and Brazil 
considerably lower than in the UK (due to lower welfare, legislation 
and environment standards) the removal or reduction of tariffs for pork 
products from those countries will have a significant negative impact on 
British pork producers.”74
41. Scottish Land & Estates agreed: “Some of our farming sectors are currently 
protected from cheaper imports because of the barriers imposed by the 
68  Rt Hon Owen Paterson MP, UK Agricultural Policy Post-Brexit, All Souls College, Oxford University, 
(January 2017): https://www.owenpaterson.org/sites/www.owenpaterson.org/files/2017–04/UK%20
2020%20Agricultural%20Policy%20Post–Brexit.pdf [accessed 21 April 2017]
69  Ryan Bourne, ‘Brexit could slash food prices — but only if we make it a free market Brexit’, blog for 
the Institute of Economic Affairs (18 October 2016): https://iea.org.uk/brexit–could–slash–food–prices–
but–only–if–we–make–it–a–free–market–brexit [accessed 21 April 2017]
70  Q 5
71 Written evidence from Which? (ABR0013)
72  Supplementary written evidence from NFU (ABR0042)
73  Written evidence from NFU Scotland (ABR0007)
74  Written evidence from National Pig Association (ABR0005)
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EU. These sectors would be vulnerable to imports if those barriers are not 
maintained once we leave.”75
42. Reflecting on the need to balance these conflicting interests, Prof Swinbank 
noted: “There are lots of different economic interests involved in this. Farmers 
may see various opportunities in one outcome whereas food consumers might 
see disadvantages.”76 Prof Matthews agreed that the Government would 
have to find the “political balance” between “providing tariff protection to 
the domestic industry [and] providing access to food at world market prices, 
or close to world market prices”.77
43. The Minister, George Eustice MP, acknowledged that “there are economists 
out there who will say that we could just stop farming and buy all our food 
cheap at world prices and this sort of thing”. But he continued: “If you look 
at the evidence it is much more complicated than that.”78
44. As well as setting the bound tariffs for the import of agricultural goods, the 
UK will have to negotiate formally with the EU to separate out its Tariff 
Rate Quotas (TRQs) and Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) from 
those currently shared between the EU’s 28 Member States.79 TRQs and the 
AMS—or Amber Box allowance for financial support—are important for 
the trade in agricultural goods. We consider each in turn.
Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs)
45. A Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ) allows a customs territory to impose a lower 
tariff rate up to a quantitative limit, but apply the higher bound tariff for 
imports after that limit has been reached.80 TRQs were introduced to provide 
some market access in the context of the high tariffs on some agricultural 
products. The EU’s TRQs include dairy, beef, lamb, poultry meat, sugar, 
fruit and vegetables.81 They can be country-specific or open to any country 
that meets the import criteria—or a hybrid.82
46. The UK is currently covered by the EU’s schedules of concessions and 
thereby also by the TRQs contained therein.83 That means the UK can 
import agricultural products from third countries at lower, or zero, tariffs. 
By virtue of its free trade agreements with third countries, the EU has also 
negotiated export TRQs that enable EU Member States—including the 
UK—to export agri-food products to those countries at preferential or zero 
tariffs.
75  Written evidence from Scottish Land & Estates (ABR0032)
76  Q 1
77  Q 34
78  Q 84
79  European Union Committee, Brexit: the options for trade (5th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 72), 
para 177
80   European Union Committee, Brexit: the options for trade (5th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 72), 
para 178
81  Written evidence submitted to the EU External Affairs Sub-Committee, 17 October 2016 (Session 
2016–17), ETG0005 (Peter Ungphakorn)
82  Some tariff rate quotas can be shared in specific amounts by a fixed number of countries, whereas 
others are open to any country that meets the import criteria. In the latter case, shares of the TRQs 
are allocated to the eligible countries on a non-discriminatory, ‘first come first served’ basis. Some 
tariff rate quotas may be a hybrid. Peter Ungphakorn, ‘The Hilton Beef Quota: a taste of what post-
BRExIT UK faces in the WTO’, Trade ß Blog (10 August 2016: https://tradebetablog.wordpress.
com/2016/08/10/hilton–beef–quota/ [accessed 26 April 2017]
83  European Union Committee, Brexit: the options for trade (5th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 72), 
paras 178–179
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47. The FDF told us that “The Government has indicated that it intends to 
secure the UK’s fair share of existing TRQs post-Brexit”—an aim that they 
supported from the perspective of the food and drinks sector:
“Achieving this will be important for importers that rely on these quotas 
to bring in essential imports of raw materials from third countries, 
particularly in the meat sector, as well as for companies that export 
finished goods outside the EU by taking advantage of these preferential 
tariffs secured via EU bilateral trade agreements.”84
48. Securing a share of the export TRQs negotiated by the EU with third 
countries is also relevant because without them some UK exports may 
become uneconomic. Christian Häberli, Senior Research Fellow at the 
World Trade Institute, reflected that “Angus Beef from Scotland presently 
exported to Korea (presumably) under a TRQ for the whole EU-28 may not 
be competitive at Korean out-of-quota (MFN) rates. Negotiations for new 
quotas reserved for UK beef may be the only way to retain market shares for 
Scotch Angus in Korea.”85
49. The Minister, George Eustice MP, told us: “We suspect that the right way to 
approach this is simply to look at technical rectification86 and to say during 
a reference period that the UK’s use of the tariff-rate quota on lamb was x 
and, therefore, that is how we should split it going forward.”87
50. Others, though, identified possible complications. Peter Ungphakorn, former 
Senior Information Officer, WTO Secretariat, noted that, based on “recent 
experience in WTO negotiations”, there could be some “bargaining over 
which representative period to use as a basis for calculations. Possible options 
include averages over the last three or five years, including or excluding the 
highest and lowest numbers”.88
51. The FDF also saw difficulties, because “Trade statistics on use of TRQs by 
UK industry are lacking.” 89 They added: “The matter is further complicated 
by the trans-shipment of goods from third countries through ports elsewhere 
in the EU such as Rotterdam, Hamburg or Naples.” Mr Häberli consequently 
believed that “negotiations with the EU-27 about export and import quota 
rights will have to consider intra-EU trade flows, transit trade and other 
factors”.90 Prof McMahon concurred:
“A detailed examination should be undertaken of the existing tariff 
quotas in the EU Schedule to determine if the UK is the major/principal 
beneficiary of those quotas. If so, there is an argument that the tariff 
quota in the UK Schedule should match the traditional pattern of trade 
for a particular product with a consequent reduction in the EU Schedule 
for that product.”91
84  Supplementary written evidence from Food and Drink Federation (ABR0044)
85  Written evidence from Christian Häberli (ABR0002)
86  A country’s schedules can be amended either through rectification or modification. Rectification 
is possible for amendments that do not alter the scope of concession, while modification implies a 
substantive change. However, this is not an uncontroversial process. European Union Committee, 
Brexit: the options for trade (5th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 72), paras 173 and 188
87  Q 85
88  Written evidence from Peter Ungphakorn (ABR0001)
89  Supplementary written evidence from Food and Drink Federation (ABR0044)
90  Written evidence from Christian Häberli (ABR0002)
91  Supplementary written evidence from Prof Joseph McMahon (ABR0039)
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52. Other WTO members, such as Australia, will take an active interest in 
this process, as Prof Swinbank told us: “How those tariff rate quotas are 
reallocated between the EU and the UK matters enormously to some of 
their trade interests. They may find that some reallocations are not to their 
liking.”92
53. In a similar vein, Prof Matthews told us that the EU would have an interest 
in preserving access to the UK market through quotas. Splitting the TRQs 
was “not just a question of allocating the New Zealand share or the American 
share”,93 but of what share of access to the UK market the EU would get 
under the revised TRQs, if a free trade deal were not reached. He concluded: 
“The idea that we will be able to arrive at the UK Schedule for tariff rate 
quotas through sharing the existing ones … may not be the right way or an 
acceptable way to go.”94
The views of other WTO members
54. The UK will need to present its schedules to other WTO members, as 
discussed in our report Brexit: the options for trade.95 Prof McMahon observed 
that “in relation to tariff rate quotas, you cannot see WTO members 
being happy with what will in essence be a move towards protectionism.”96 
Prof Matthews elaborated the point:
“I could see attempts by producer interests in other countries to say, 
‘this is an opportunity to improve our access, so let’s try to get our 
Governments to be a bit more aggressive than they otherwise might be’. 
We might put forward … the idea that somehow we might just share 
the obligations that the EU 28 has at present … but I could see other 
[WTO] members seeing this as an opportunity to try to improve their 
position.”97
55. Prof McMahon agreed: “If the UK gets a tariff rate quota split-off, you can 
imagine that other members of the WTO will be very annoyed, because 
there will be a tariff rate quota coming into existence after tariff rate quotas 
were supposed to come into existence.98 They were supposed to come into 
existence in 1995 or on accession to the WTO. The UK has been a member 
since 1948.99 This is a very unusual occurrence.”100
92  Q 6
93  Q 32
94  Q 40
95  European Union Committee, Brexit: the options for trade (5th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 72)
96  Q 33
97  Q 32
98  Tariff rate quotas were introduced by the WTO Agreement on Agriculture to maintain existing access 
levels for agricultural imports and to guarantee minimum access opportunities. This was in response 
to the conversion of non-tariff barriers on agricultural products into tariffs (“tariffication”). Under 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) TRQs can be put in place as a “compensatory 
adjustment” to the terms on which two (or more) WTO members trade following a finding of a WTO 
dispute settlement panel: see World Trade Organization, European Union-Measures Affecting Tariff 
Concessions on Certain Poultry Meat Products, WT/DS492/R (March 2017)
99  The UK has been a signatory to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) since 1948. 
It was the predecessor to the WTO, which was established in 1995. World Trade Organization, The 
GATT years: from Havana to Marrakesh (2017): https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/
fact4_e.htm [accessed 21 April 2017]
100  Q 32
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56. The Minister acknowledged the potential difficulties: “There may be some 
countries that say that we have lost the option to be able to choose a market 
because part of it is now separated out. That is a consequence, largely, of 
the fact that we are leaving the EU and, therefore, it is not a single market 
anymore.”101 However, he believed that “those countries will still want a 
tariff-rate quota to the UK, and it is difficult to think of a better way to do 
it than to look at the historical track record during a reference period and to 
allocate it in that way”.102
57. Mr Ungphakorn questioned the Minister’s approach: “Many who have first-
hand experience of how the WTO works … doubt whether other WTO 
members would accept the UK’s legal arguments, and whether the legalistic 
approach would be enough. I share that view.”103 For example, he said: “To 
account for current UK-EU trade in sheep and goat meat, almost 100,000 
tonnes would be added to the combined UK and EU-27 tariff quota, 
around 33% more than its present size. That seems to stretch the idea of 
‘rectification’ (a technical correction) too far.”104 He concluded that “the UK 
and EU quotas should be settled by negotiation, where both political and 
commercial interests would play a part.”105
Splitting the Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS)
58. Under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture WTO members started to move 
away from giving farmers domestic support that was tied to production, 
or production subsidies.106 The types of permitted domestic agricultural 
support are classified according to which WTO ‘box’ they fall into. Green 
Box subsidies are permissible under WTO rules and are not subject to 
spending limits, whereas Amber Box subsidies are severely restricted (see 
Box 2).
101  Q 85
102  Q 85
103  Written evidence from Peter Ungphakorn (ABR0001)
104  Written evidence from Peter Ungphakorn (ABR0001)
105  Written evidence from Peter Ungphakorn (ABR0001)
106  L. Madureira, J. Lima Santos, A. Ferreira et al, Feasibility Study on the Valuation of Public Goods and 
Externalities in EU Agriculture (JRC Scientific and Policy Reports, European Commission, 2013) 14.
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Box 2: Domestic agricultural support
Green Box contains measures of support that have “no, or at most minimal, 
effects on production”, and which do not distort trade. Such measures must be 
government-funded and cannot take the form of price support. Examples of 
Green Box measures are subsidies which are de-coupled from production levels 
or prices, some environmental protection programmes and rural development 
programmes. Any domestic agricultural support measure that falls under the 
Green Box is permissible. Annex 2 to the Agreement on Agriculture sets out the 
details of when a support measure falls under the Green Box.
Amber Box contains domestic support measures which are considered to 
distort production and trade. After subsequent rounds of domestic support 
reduction, some 30 WTO members have declared a level of maximum Amber 
Box support in their schedules. This is a commitment to capping and reducing 
their levels of trade-distorting domestic support. This commitment is known as 
the ‘aggregate measurement of support’ (AMS) and represents the maximum 
allowable level of Amber Box domestic support the Member can give. Any 
trade-distorting support beyond the level of the AMS is a breach of the rules 
and can be disputed by other WTO members. The EU has a single AMS on 
behalf of all Member States.
De Minimis: Under the Agreement on Agriculture, there is no requirement 
for developed countries to reduce their trade-distorting domestic support in 
a given year provided that the aggregate value of any product specific support 
does not exceed 5% of the total value of production of the agricultural product 
in question. In addition, non-product specific support which is less than 5% of 
the value of total agricultural production is also exempt. This is known as the de 
minimis provisions. Even WTO members without an Amber Box allowance may 
provide trade distorting domestic support up to the de minimis levels.
Blue Box measures include direct payments made under a production-limiting 
programme. This means the aim should be to limit production by imposing 
production quotas requiring farmers to set aside part of their land. Only a 
handful of WTO members use Blue Box measures.
Source: World Trade Organization, Domestic support—amber, blue and green boxes (October 2001): https://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd07_domestic_e.htm [accessed 21 April 2017], Article 6, 
and Annex II World Trade Organisation, Agreement on Agriculture (2017): https://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/legal_e/14–ag_01_e.htm [accessed 21 April 2017] and written evidence from Prof Michael Cardwell 
(ABR0049)
59. The UK is currently covered by the EU’s AMS or Amber Box commitment. 
If the UK does not negotiate a share of the EU’s AMS, the UK could see its 
future agricultural policy choices constrained. In the words of Prof Swinbank: 
“How the maximum amount of subsidy that the EU is currently allowed to 
give to its farm sector would be shared out between the EU and the United 
Kingdom … could be crucial depending upon the sort of policy we wanted 
to pursue later.”107 The Minister told us:
“There is a school of thought that says that if we are going to go into a 
world where we are pursuing policies that are less market-distorting and 
more about supporting environmental outcomes and animal welfare, 
how important is it to have that share of the Amber Box? I think the 
107  Q 6
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problem is that the more we look at this the answer is that it probably is 
still quite important to have that share.”108
60. Michael Cardwell, Professor of Agricultural Law at the University of Leeds, 
explained that one way to divide the Amber Box allowance would be to 
determine the EU’s current permitted level of domestic support; according 
to the most recent Notification by the EU the AMS was “72,378 million 
Euros.”109 However, this was “in the name of the EU without distinction as to 
separate entitlement of individual Member States”, and it was “not possible 
to identify a separate ‘share’” for the UK, because the UK was already a 
member of the EU when the AMS was first calculated.110 It would also be 
difficult to determine the amount of UK support which formed part of the 
original calculation of the AMS, thanks to “problems in obtaining historic 
data and in fixing sterling conversion rates”.
61. An alternative approach, he told us, would be to determine the UK’s 
entitlement based on current UK receipts of CAP payments. This could be 
“calculated as a ratio of UK:EU CAP payments (over a representative period 
of three years) applied to the EU’s total subsidy commitments”.111 He noted, 
however, that “questions might arise as to whether exempt support should 
also be included in the calculation; and the UK may suffer disadvantage 
as a result of a pattern of relatively low expenditure on rural development 
programmes when compared with other Member States”.112
62. The Minister favoured the second approach: “We suspect that the logical 
way to deal with that is through a process of technical rectification where 
you simply say that the UK’s share of the EU’s Amber Box and Blue Box is 
x based on our allocation of the CAP budget. That would seem to be the 
simplest, most sensible way to proceed.”113 He added that “I do not think at 
the moment that the EU comes anywhere close to using all of its Amber Box, 
so it is not that it is a box that people want to fight over”.114 We return to the 
issue of funding in Chapter 5.
The views of other WTO members
63. Though the Minister was confident about the prospect for negotiating a 
share of the AMS, others were more cautious. Prof Matthews told us that 
a Brexit split of the AMS would mean that the UK would claim an AMS 
entitlement, while many WTO countries who “would love to have such an 
entitlement today” do not.115 He mentioned China and India as “obvious 
examples where both countries are currently alleged to exceed their current 
de minimis limits on trade-distorting support … One might not be surprised 
if some objections were raised from these quarters to the idea that the UK 
would be entitled as of right to an [AMS].”116 On the other hand, he noted:
“Splitting the EU-28 AMS between the UK and the EU-27 may be 
an acceptable outcome to the other WTO Members because (a) it is 
108  Q 84
109  Written evidence from Prof Michael Cardwell (ABR0049)
110  Written evidence from Prof Michael Cardwell (ABR0049)
111  Written evidence from Prof Michael Cardwell (ABR0049)
112  Written evidence from Prof Michael Cardwell (ABR0049)
113  Q 84
114  Q 84
115  Supplementary written evidence from Prof Alan Matthews (ABR0038)
116  Supplementary written evidence from Prof Alan Matthews (ABR0038)
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the reverse procedure to what happens when a country joins the EU, 
and (b) it would lead to a lower Bound Total AMS (BTAMS) for the 
EU-27 which would be more restrictive on future EU trade-distorting 
agricultural policies.”117
64. The Minister believed that “the likelihood is that nothing we are proposing 
will cause much trouble with the WTO rules”.118 But he also acknowledged 
that other WTO countries could cause difficulties: “We do not know whether 
people will want to press this point and have an argument about it. If they 
do, then they may be sacrificing their ability to ask something else of us that 
they want from us. That is the nature of a negotiation.”119
Agricultural support without an AMS entitlement
65. The Government has committed to matching current levels of CAP funding 
until 2020. But some witnesses questioned whether this would be possible if 
the UK withdrew from the EU without a share of the EU’s AMS. According 
to Prof Swinbank, if the UK “ended up with a very small allowance” and 
continued granting “that same support” after Brexit, “we could end up 
exceeding our WTO allowances. What would then follow from that would 
depend upon whether anyone challenged us, how long it took and what sort 
of measures were taken against us.”120
66. But Prof Cardwell believed that, as long as the Basic Payment and greening 
measures were regarded as decoupled income support, “there should be no 
difficulty in meeting domestic support commitments” if the UK continued 
to implement the CAP regime until 2020.121
Conclusions and recommendations
67. In our report Brexit: trade in goods we concluded: “When 
establishing its own schedules at the WTO, the UK Government 
must give particular consideration to the implications of tariffs on 
the UK agricultural sector. High tariffs on imports would raise the 
cost to UK consumers, whereas lower tariffs could reduce the cost of 
food to consumers, but might undermine the domestic agricultural 
sector’s competitiveness.” We endorse this conclusion and underline 
its importance.
68. Reaching agreement on dividing the EU’s Tariff Rate Quotas for 
agricultural products could be challenging, not least because the 
proposed reallocation will be open to negotiation by WTO members, 
not only the EU. We urge the Government to analyse the current 
patterns of trade under existing TRQs and the implications of a 
proposed split on the agricultural sectors and food manufacturers that 
benefit from the current TRQs in preparation for these negotiations.
69. There is no precedent for splitting the Aggregate Measurement 
of Support—or the Amber Box entitlement—and in our view the 
117  Supplementary written evidence from Prof Alan Matthews (ABR0038)
118  Q 84
119  Q 84
120  Q 6. Prof Alan Swinbank explained that the direct payments made to farmers under the CAP are 
currently considered to fall within the Green Box, though some have questioned whether they should 
be Amber Box instead. He added that no-one has challenged the EU on this matter in the past because 
of its large allowance.
121  Written evidence from Prof Michael Cardwell (ABR0049)
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Minister was over-confident that other WTO members would accept 
such a split. We invite the Government to confirm that it is considering 
alternatives, should the split be contested.
Negotiating a UK-EU trade agreement
70. Further to establishing its WTO schedules, the UK will need to negotiate 
trade agreements with the EU and third countries.122 The Minister told us 
that “the first thing coming down the tracks is the negotiation on a future 
free trade agreement with the EU”.123
71. In approaching those negotiations, Prof Matthews noted that “In global 
terms, the UK is a very attractive market. It is a big, prosperous market 
and it is a net importer of food. Therefore, a lot of countries will be very 
interested to try to improve their access to this market.”124 The Minister 
agreed: “We have a trade deficit in food and drink alone with the EU of 
around £18 billion a year, so this is an area where it is in their interests really 
to do a free trade agreement.”125
72. Mr Ungphakorn, on the other hand, reminded us that “Agriculture is a 
particularly sensitive sector for various reasons: politics, culture, concerns 
about rural society, food security, and so on.”126 The Institute of Grocery 
Distribution (IGD) agreed: “All new trade deals are complicated”, but “food 
related issues tend to take centre stage in most trade deals … and are often 
the trickiest and most sensitive elements to negotiate”.127
73. Mr Ungphakorn explained that the challenge for the UK would be:
“To strike a balance between:
• the demand for support and protection from the UK’s own farmers
• the demand from UK consumers and processors for cheaper food and 
raw materials
• the demand from exporters in the other countries for access to the UK 
market.”128
Priorities for trade with the EU
74. We asked witnesses about their priorities for EU-UK agri-food trade. Guy 
Smith, Vice President of the NFU, told us: “We would like to see business 
as usual so that we trade with our ex-EU partners much the same as we did 
before.”129 He added that “it is in our interests to have free trade access to 
those [EU] markets, much as we have done in the past, not encumbered 
by tariffs or border controls, which would add costs into our industry”.130 
122  The priorities for a new EU arrangement on food and beverages and for new FTAs with non-EU 
countries were discussed in our report Brexit: trade in goods.
123  Q 85
124  Q 32 
125  Q 85
126  Written evidence from Peter Ungphakorn (ABR0001)
127  Supplementary written evidence from IGD (ABR0043)
128  Written evidence from Peter Ungphakorn (ABR0001) also mentioned “the trade-off with UK 
producers in other sectors (such as services) wanting access to the other countries’ markets, which 
might entail opening up UK agriculture.” However, this is beyond the scope of this report and will not 
be considered in detail.
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Mr Hardwick agreed that “some form of continued tariff-free access to the 
European Union would be my absolute number one priority”, describing it 
as “absolutely essential”.131
75. Fergus Ewing MSP, Scottish Government Cabinet Secretary for the Rural 
Economy and Connectivity, agreed:
“Retaining tariff free access to the European Single Market is crucial to 
sustainability and growth in the rural economy. The [EU] continues to 
be Scotland’s top food export market and this trade creates a virtuous, 
mutually beneficial relationship for our food producers.”132
76. From a Welsh perspective, NFU Cymru told us:
“The EU single market is by far our largest export destination with 
around a third of our lamb crop ending up on the European Market, 
and around 90% of Welsh food and drink exports going in to the single 
market … It is vital that we continue to enjoy free and unfettered access 
to these markets, free of tariff and non-tariff barriers.”133
77. Dairy UK provided a sector-specific example: “With 80% of dairy exports 
going to EU countries, mostly in the form of cheese, butter, cream and 
milk powders, continued access to the EU market is essential for UK dairy 
companies.”134
Tariff barriers and EU trade
78. In a free trade agreement tariff levels are generally lower than those provided 
for by the MFN principle under WTO rules. In the absence of such an 
agreement, our witnesses expressed concern at the impact of the higher MFN 
tariffs upon EU-UK trade. Focusing on exports, the AHDB explained:
“Higher tariffs on exports to the EU (indeed any tariffs as there are none 
at present) would put UK at an immediate disadvantage over competing 
countries with continued tariff free access … in the primary agriculture 
sectors where margins on primary products are low, small additional 
costs can make products uncompetitive.”135
79. Scott Walker, CEO at NFU Scotland, told the EU Select Committee that 
“If we do default to WTO rules for trading with Europe, in effect that closes 
any food exports across to Europe … just pure tariffs just close the deal 
altogether.”136 Mr Ewing agreed: “Should the UK fail to reach agreement 
with the EU … and fall back to trade under World Trade Organization 
terms, this would entail significant risk for sections of Scottish agriculture, 
such as cattle and sheep.”137
131  Q 56
132  Written evidence from Scottish Government (ABR0052)
133  Written evidence from NFU Cymru (ABR0034)
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136  Oral evidence taken before the European Union Select Committee, 1 February 2017 (Session 2016–
17), Q 49 
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80. The Rt Hon Carwyn Jones AM, First Minister of Wales, raised a similar 
concern:
“The effects of trading with the EU under the WTO rules on Welsh 
agriculture, fisheries and food will be very significant. Products from 
these areas will be hit by some of the most extreme tariffs under the 
WTO rules … It has been predicted trade opportunities in food related 
areas may fall by around 70–90%.”138
81. We heard particular concerns about the impact of tariffs on the sheep sector. 
The National Sheep Association told us that “the UK sheep sector exports 
up to 40% of production, with 96% of this going to the EU”.139 Scottish 
Land & Estates warned: “Hill farming could face very difficult times.”140
82. The British Meat Processors Association (BMPA) cautioned that beef 
exports would also be at a disadvantage: “In most cases, [the EU] tariff 
equates to an addition of 50 per cent or more to the value of imports, which 
seriously impacts on the ability of imported beef to compete with EU meat.” 
As for pigs: “The high level of tariffs effectively means that most non-EU 
pork is uncompetitive on the EU market.”141
83. Tariffs would also hit other sectors. Dairy UK told us that: “Imposition of 
the WTO schedule by the UK would make EU [dairy] imports into the UK 
much more expensive”.142 The National Association of British and Irish Flour 
Millers (nabim) raised similar concerns for the cereal industry, highlighting 
the “significant volumes” of trade with the EU: “This trade (whether imports 
or exports) would not be maintained if tariffs were imposed. Therefore the 
health of the cereals sector on both sides of the channel depends on the 
retention of tariff free trade between the UK and the EU 27 once we leave 
the Union.”143
84. One exception to the general concern was fruit and vegetables, where the 
Food Foundation noted that “for horticultural produce the EU’s external 
tariff rate is … relatively low … there are currently around 300 fresh fruit 
and vegetable EU tariff lines, and a similar number for processed products; 
and most of these tariffs are already minimal”.144
85. Against this backdrop, the Minister, referencing a study commissioned by 
the NFU, struck an optimistic note:
“It is difficult to look at this in isolation, [but] what it showed is that 
a straight reversion to WTO rules would probably, in most sectors of 
agriculture, lead to a firming in farmgate prices because competition 
from Europe would go down. The only exception is the sheep sector, 
which is heavily dependent on access to the French market in particular. 
From our point of view—although it is not what we want, and obviously 
we are going into this asking for that bold and comprehensive free trade 
138  Written evidence from Welsh Government (ABR0050)
139  Written evidence from the National Sheep Association (ABR0025)
140  Written evidence from Scottish Land & Estates (ABR0032), see also further supplementary written 
evidence from AHDB (ABR0040) and Q 28 (Tim Breitmeyer)
141  Written evidence from British Meat Processors Association (ABR0041)
142  Written evidence from Dairy UK (ABR0035)
143  Written evidence from nabim (ABR0028)
144  Written evidence from The Food Foundation (ABR0030)
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agreement—most sectors of agriculture do not have a great deal to fear 
from that if that were the outcome.”145
Supply chains and agricultural inputs
86. Complex and extensive supply chains link the UK and the EU. The Farmers’ 
Union of Wales (FUW) told us: “If post Brexit policies have the effect of 
severing well-established supply chains which currently extend across the 
current EU, disruption would be widespread.”146
87. At the beginning of the supply chain, the British Growers Association told 
us that UK producers were “reliant on importing raw materials and inputs”, 
and that “it is not clear the extent to which tariffs might apply to these 
inputs and the impact on production costs and ultimately the cost of food to 
consumers”.147
88. The Agriculture Industries Confederation (AIC) told us that significant 
volumes of animal feed were imported from the EU or from non-EU 
countries through the EU. They noted that “the UK pig and poultry sectors 
in particular are very reliant on this imported vegetable protein, a quantity 
and quality which cannot be replicated domestically and both sectors would 
face massive risks if supplies were disrupted or their cost was increased”.148 
Turning to crop protection products, such as pesticides, they noted that 
“some 85% of the market is supplied with products manufactured elsewhere 
in the EU.”
89. The AIC also told us that the “significant majority of oilseed rape seed, all 
forage maize seed and … all sugar beet seed is imported from the EU”.149 
They cautioned: “Without this access at a commercially viable rate these 
crops would suffer significantly in their competitive position.” Nabim, 
representing the UK flour milling industry, told us that they would “strongly 
support” retaining a system with “low to zero duties on raw materials”.150
90. The broader issue of supply chains present a unique challenge on the island 
of Ireland.151 Noel Lavery, Permanent Secretary of the Department of 
Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs (DAERA) in Northern Ireland, 
told us: “The level of North/South integration in production/processing 
chains is considerable. Many agri-food businesses are structured and operate 
on a cross-border basis.”152 This made them especially vulnerable to the 
imposition of customs controls and tariffs. Ian Wright, Director General of 
the FDF, gave an illustration: “If you take one example—a bottle of Baileys 
Irish Cream—one in five cows in Ireland produces the milk and, if you are 
a Northern Irish cow, your milk crosses the border five times before it goes 
into the bottle. The idea that that would be subject to tariffs hither and yon 
is really very scary.”153
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Non-tariff barriers
91. As we noted in our report Brexit: trade in goods,154 non-tariff barriers can be 
as costly, or costlier, to producers than tariffs. Non-tariff barriers, which 
are prohibited between Member States by the EU Treaties,155 include all 
government-imposed and sponsored actions or omissions that act as 
prohibitions or restrictions on trade, other than ordinary customs duties, 
and other duties and charges on imports and exports.156 Examples include 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, labelling requirements, pre-shipment 
inspection and formalities, subsidies and rules of origin as well as protected 
product descriptions known as Geographical Indicators (GIs).157
Box 3: SPS and TBT Agreements
The Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS 
Agreement) sets out the basic rules on food safety and animal and plant health 
standards. WTO member countries are encouraged to base their policies on 
existing international standards, guidelines and recommendations. They are 
then unlikely to be challenged in a WTO dispute. The SPS Agreement also 
allows countries to set their own higher standards, but these must be based on 
‘sound science’ and should only be applied to the extent necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health. They should not discriminate between 
countries where identical or similar conditions prevail.
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) aims 
to ensure that technical regulations, standards, and conformity assessment 
procedures are non-discriminatory and do not create unnecessary obstacles to 
trade. The TBT Agreement also recognises WTO members’ right to implement 
measures to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as the protection of human 
health and safety, or protection of the environment. The TBT Agreement 
encourages members to base their measures on existing international standards.
Source: World Trade Organization, Technical barriers to trade (2017): https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
tbt_e/tbt_e.htm [accessed 21 April 2017] and World Trade Organization, Standards and safety (2017): https://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm4_e.htm [accessed 21 April 2017]
92. Post-Brexit the UK and the EU could seek to minimise non-tariff barriers 
in three main ways: harmonisation of standards, mutual recognition of 
standards and equivalence. These terms are explained in Box 4.
154  European Union Committee, Brexit: trade in goods (16th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 129)
155  Articles 24–36, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 326 (consolidated version of 
26 October 2012)
156  A taxonomy of non-tariff measures was developed under the leadership of UNCTAD. United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, International Classification of Non-Tariff Measures (2012), p 3: 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditctab20122_en.pdf [accessed 21 April 2017]. We consider 
‘rules of origin’ in detail in our report European Union Committee, Brexit: trade in goods (16th Report, 
Session 2016–17, HL Paper 129), pp 44–45
157  Agriculture & Horticulture Development Board, What might Brexit mean for UK trade in agricultural 
products? (October 2016), p 7: http://www.ahdb.org.uk/documents/Horizon_Brexit_Analysis_Report–
Oct2016.pdf [accessed 21 April 2017]
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Box 4: Regulations and trade
• Harmonisation of standards: for example, the UK and French authorities 
may apply precisely the same regulatory standards.
• Mutual recognition: for example, the UK authorities may apply one set of 
standards, and the French another. The standards are not identical, but 
each admits a product once it has been approved in the other country.
• Equivalence: equivalence means that it is determined that different 
standards sufficiently address a regulatory objective—such as sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection—through different means.
Source: European Union Committee, Brexit: trade in goods (16th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 129), paras 
144–145
93. Non-tariff barrier-free trade with the EU after Brexit was a key priority for 
our witnesses. NFU Scotland wanted to see “limited regulatory divergence 
so that no non-tariff barriers are introduced”.158 Dairy UK agreed.159 WWF 
also highlighted the risk of regulatory divergence: “Any weakening of [current] 
regulations, either as a result of domestic policy or trade agreements, will 
result in restricting access to the EU markets. This will impact the farming 
sectors [sic] ability to trade with its biggest market.”160
94. Mr Hardwick was therefore clear that “whatever we do, if we want an ongoing 
trading relationship with the European Union we will have to align ourselves 
largely with their legislation”.161 In a recent speech, Phil Hogan, European 
Commissioner for Agriculture, struck a similar note: “We would never 
accept a lowering of our standards in the EU, and we have been consistently 
effective in protecting standards in all our global trade agreements.”162 We 
therefore concluded in our report Brexit: trade in goods that “If the current 
level of EU-UK trade is to be maintained, ongoing harmonisation or mutual 
recognition of regulatory standards may be required.”163 We welcomed the 
Government’s decision—by means of the Great Repeal Bill—to preserve 
existing EU regulations in domestic law as a first step towards this goal.
95. The Minister told us that the Great Repeal Bill would bring technical 
legislation, such as “rules on labelling, food standards, standards in 
slaughterhouses and maximum residue limits” into domestic law, meaning 
that at the outset of negotiations there would be “a remarkable degree of 
equivalence.”164 He concluded: “Some of those non-trade tariff barriers that 
slow down other trade deals are less of a factor when it comes to the EU and 
it is why I think that, if the will is there, we could put together a free trade 
agreement quite quickly.”
158  Written evidence from NFU Scotland (ABR0007)
159  Written evidence from Dairy UK (ABR0035)
160  Written evidence from WWF (ABR0010)
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162  European Commission, Keynote Address by Commissioner Phil Hogan at the 73rd FNPL Congress in 
Langres, France (March 2017): https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014–2019/hogan/
announcements/keynote–address–commissioner–phil–hogan–73rd–fnpl–congress–langres–france–
16th–march–2017_en [accessed 5 April 2017]
163  European Union Committee, Brexit: trade in goods (16th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 129), 
para 182
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Non-tariff barriers and border controls
96. As the UK withdraws from the customs union UK-EU trade will be subject 
to customs checks and controls to ascertain that products are of a satisfactory 
standard. In our report Brexit: trade in goods, we concluded that this would 
“result in costly administrative requirements and customs procedures, 
whatever new framework for trade is established”.165
97. Border and customs checks are a particular challenge for the agri-food 
sector. Prof Swinbank gave a graphic example: “One thinks of the port of 
Dover trying to cope with products coming in and coming out. If we have to 
start checking microbiological contamination of chicken carcasses coming 
from the Netherlands, for example, those tests can take several days and 
the product wastes in that period.”166 The ADHB also raised concerns over 
“delays at ports/points of entry for perishable goods such as fruit, vegetables 
and meat”.167
98. Prof Matthews told us the EU would need to certify that UK products 
entering the Single Market meet EU standards, and that this process of 
certification becomes increasingly important if UK regulations underpinning 
the production of those products “begin to differ”.168 He noted: “If it is a 
Welsh meat product, say, the European Union might need to inspect that 
Welsh meat plant in addition to your own Food Standards Agency doing 
that for your domestic market”. He therefore suggested that “it would be 
highly desirable to ensure that there are … co-operation agreements—
Mutual Recognition Agreements—whereby the EU would recognise that 
your Food Standards Agency, in inspecting that Welsh meat plant, would 
also be certifying for export to the EU.”
99. From a food manufacturing perspective, the FDF told us that the current 
regulatory cohesion between the UK and the EU is “the key to trading on 
a level playing field” and that, in the event that the regulatory framework in 
the UK is reviewed after Brexit, there needs to be a “mechanism” in place 
“to ensure mutual recognition of potentially different regulatory systems”.169
100. Regarding the practicalities of demonstrating equivalent standards, the 
AHDB informed us that monitoring and demonstrating equivalent standards 
was not “necessarily that difficult or onerous as the UK, in effect, already 
acts as the primary guarantor to the EU of compliance with EU standards 
and indeed those required in third countries”.170
101. If the UK and the EU did negotiate a free trade agreement, agricultural goods 
and food would also have to comply with rules of origin. These determine 
where a product and its components were produced, and are essential to 
determining which tariff to levy.171 The AHDB explained that “If the UK 
wishes to have the complete freedom to secure similar trade agreements 
outside the EU then rules of origin are likely to make additional controls 
inevitable”, adding that “it is imperative that these controls do not create a 
165  European Union Committee, Brexit: trade in goods (16th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 129), 
para 226
166  Q 7
167  Further supplementary written evidence from AHDB (ABR0040)
168  Q 37
169  Supplementary written evidence from Food and Drink Federation (ABR0044)
170  Further supplementary written evidence from AHDB (ABR0040)
171  For a more detailed analysis of rules of origin, please European Union Committee, Brexit: trade in 
goods (16th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 129)
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situation in which supply chains do not operate as freely as they do now.”172 
The Minister acknowledged that “if you were to do a trade deal with another 
country, there would be country of origin rules that mean that you cannot 
use that same product to circumvent whatever external tariffs the EU has”.173 
He told us: “There is a means of doing this; it is what every other country in 
the world does with the trade agreements they have, and we would adopt a 
similar approach those country of origin rules where it was necessary.”
Northern Ireland
102. The land border in Northern Ireland again presents a particular challenge. 
Dr Viviane Gravey, Dr Brian Jack and Dr Lee McGowan from Queen’s 
University Belfast stated: “The mere introduction of border controls alone, 
without even considering customs tariffs, would have a significant impact 
on the agri-food industry on the island of Ireland. The cost of producing the 
necessary paperwork has been placed at €20 to €80 per border crossing.”174
103. Furthermore, DAERA pointed out: “The fact that Northern Ireland has a 
land border adds an additional dimension to this, with the very real possibility 
of illegal movements. Therefore, both tariff and non-tariff arrangements post 
the UK’s exit from the EU are of major concern for the agri-food sector.”175
Geographical indicators
104. Some witnesses mentioned geographical indicators (GIs)176 as a priority for 
a trade agreement with the EU.177 Only products meeting the requirements 
of the GI can use the protected name, for example Cornish pasties or Scotch 
Whisky.178 According to the AHDB there are 61 UK-registered products 
protected by some form of GI, many of which are cheeses or meat products.179
105. Mr Hardwick saw GIs as one way of adding value to a product, and therefore 
told us that “we would want to retain those that we have”.180 Jon Woolven, 
Strategy Director at IGD, noted that “for those people who have that 
protection it has been hard-fought-for, it is very valuable and those companies 
would not want to relinquish it”.181 But he noted that other companies might 
172  Further supplementary written evidence from AHDB (ABR0040)
173  Q 85
174  Written evidence from Dr Viviane Gravey, Dr Brian Jack and Dr Lee McGowan (ABR0021)
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176  GIs are a form of intellectual property right in the same way as a patent, copyright or a trademark. 
There are three types of geographical indicators (GIs) for agri-food products in the EU: the Protected 
Designation of Origin (PDO) and the Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) both require a specific 
link to the region where the product comes from, while the Traditional Speciality Guaranteed (TSG) 
highlights a traditional production process. European Commission, ‘EU quality logos’, (2017): http://
ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/schemes_en [accessed 21 April 2017]
177  Under Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 of 20 March 2006 on the protection of geographical 
indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs OJ L 93/12 (31 
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intellectual property protection is administered and regulated by the EU’s Intellectual Property 
Agency in Alicante the EUIPO.
178  European Commission, ‘E-Spirit-Drinks’, (January 2012): http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/spirits/
index.cfm?event=searchIndication [accessed 21 April 2017]
179  Agriculture & Horticulture Development Board, The impact of Brexit on protected food names 
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wish to produce products called, for instance ‘Parma-style ham’, and that 
this had been “a particular sticking area in some of the international trade 
negotiations, for instance with the US”.
106. Prof McMahon told us that the EU scheme for GIs allowed for international 
registration, “So once the UK leaves it will become a third country and 
it will still be able to register [GIs].”182 Wyn Grant, Emeritus Professor of 
Politics at the University of Warwick, and Mr Hardwick agreed.183
Conclusions and recommendations
107. The UK is a net importer of food and therefore a very attractive market 
for agri-food products both from the EU and globally. We expect this 
to give the UK a strong position during trade negotiations for those 
products both with the EU and, after Brexit, with third countries.
108. Nevertheless, leaving the Single Market and the Customs Union will 
create significant uncertainty for the UK agri-food sector. The EU 
is the single largest market for UK agriculture and food products, 
and our witnesses were clear that preserving tariff and non-tariff 
barrier free trade with the EU should be a priority. If the UK leaves 
the EU without agreeing a comprehensive UK-EU FTA, or a form 
of transitional arrangement, UK-EU trade would have to proceed 
according to WTO rules. Many of our agricultural producers, and 
our food manufacturers, would incur substantial costs associated 
with tariff and non-tariff barriers when exporting to the EU, with 
sectors such as pig and sheep meat at particular risk.
109. Moreover, the agricultural and food manufacturing sectors are 
integrated into EU-wide supply chains. It is imperative that a UK-
EU trade deal should avoid the imposition of tariffs on trade in both 
directions, to minimise the potential for disrupting those supply 
chains.
110. Non-tariff barriers could be equally if not more disruptive to trade in 
agricultural products and food. Products must meet the standards of 
the EU market in order to enter it. If UK and EU regulatory frameworks 
begin to differ after Brexit, there is a risk of substantial non-tariff 
barriers for agri-food producers. The greater this divergence, the 
greater the need for customs checks and certification of products and 
production facilities. This could be costly and time consuming for 
UK farmers and food manufacturers wishing to export to the EU.
111. In our report Brexit: trade in goods we urged the Government “to 
maintain close dialogue with the EU over the development of UK and 
EU standards post-Brexit, to avoid unnecessary divergence.” We 
endorse and re-state this recommendation.
112. Customs procedures and associated delays would have a particularly 
strong negative impact on the agri-food sector, where products are 
often perishable and food supply chains are highly integrated across 
the UK and the EU.
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113. Agri-food supply chains are particularly highly integrated between 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The re-introduction of 
border controls and tariffs could severely disrupt this industry, and 
could lead to an increase in cross-border smuggling. We therefore 
repeat the recommendation made in our report on Brexit: UK-Irish 
relations that the Government should make every effort to avoid the 
re-introduction of customs controls on the Irish land border.
New market opportunities
Non-EU markets
114. Brexit may also open up new non-EU trading opportunities. Mr Smith told 
us: “It must always be our ambition to seek out markets wherever we can find 
them and to place an expectation on the British Government to help us find 
those markets. There are emerging really interesting markets, particularly 
in the Far East, for poultry, pigs, red meat in particular.”184 Wesley Aston, 
Chief Executive of the Ulster Farmers’ Union, agreed:
“We want to look at new markets, particularly for what we call fifth-
quarter products, which are products that British and European 
consumers do not eat, that go to China or wherever. We certainly see 
that if those could be opened it would give us a better return for those 
particular products that currently we have to pay to dispose of.”185
Tim Breitmeyer, Deputy President of the Country Land and Business 
Association (CLA), George Dunn, Chief Executive of the TFA, the FDF 
and FUW all took a similar view.186
115. Though there are opportunities for increasing trade globally, some witnesses 
were not convinced that this could off-set a potential loss in UK-EU trade.187 
The First Minister of Wales told us: “Curtailing access to [the European 
Market] for our produce will leave a hole which will not be easy or quick 
to fill.”188 The British Poultry Council agreed: “Contrary to popular belief, 
third countries are not able to ‘take up the slack’ in trade that may be caused 
by Brexit … loss of trade with [EU] Member States will not inevitably lead 
to increases elsewhere.”189 The IGD echoed the point from the perspective 
of the wider food sector: “Reduced trade in agriculture and food with the 
EU might be offset, at least in part, by increasing trade elsewhere but there 
is no single country or trading bloc that could be a like-for-like substitute.”190
116. The AHDB agreed that it would take time to develop alternative markets.191 
EU trade could be off-set in some cases, “but not immediately as the trade 
within the EU enjoys the enormous benefits of proximity and speed of 
delivery (crucial for perishable products) and trade free of official customs 
controls and duties”.192
184  Q 48; also Q 29 (Tim Breitmeyer)
185  Q 47
186  Q 29 (Tim Breitmeyer, George Dunn), supplementary written evidence from Food and Drink 
Federation (ABR0044) and written evidence from Farmers’ Union of Wales (ABR0045)
187  This issue is also considered in our report European Union Committee, Brexit: trade in goods (16th 
Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 129).
188  Written evidence from Welsh Government (ABR0050)
189  Written evidence from British Poultry Council (ABR0027)
190  Supplementary written evidence from IGD (ABR0043)
191  Further supplementary written evidence from AHDB (ABR0040)
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Grandfathering existing FTAs
117. Some witnesses thought it important to review the status of the more than 
36 preferential trade agreements, covering 60 third countries,193 which the 
EU has negotiated on behalf of Member States. DAERA told us that “we 
should be striving to retain current access arrangements in the short term”,194 
while Mr Smith suggested that some “interim arrangement” could perhaps 
be agreed so that the UK could “continue to use the agreements we have in 
place by virtue of EU membership when we have left the European Union”.195
118. Prof McMahon suggested that the UK might be able to negotiate continued 
access to such FTAs after Brexit:
“Those agreements are what are termed in EU law mixed agreements. 
This means that the UK remains bound by that particular arrangement 
… because it is a mixed agreement the UK also has the opportunity to 
figure out, in association with the third country, how it will deal with 
the relationship.”196
Mr Hardwick, however, warned that “whilst you could try to grandfather 
part of a trade agreement with another country, and that might be accepted, 
it just takes one member [of the WTO] to step in the way”.197
119. In our report Brexit: the options for trade we considered the question of 
whether the UK could preserve, or ‘grandfather’ existing FTAs, concluding 
as follows: “On the balance of evidence, we conclude that the UK is unlikely 
to be able to retain access to the EU’s FTAs with third countries following 
Brexit, whether they are mixed agreements or not.”198 In our subsequent 
report, Brexit: trade in goods, we endorsed that conclusion: “We remain of 
the view that the UK is unlikely to be able to maintain access to the EU’s 
preferential trade agreements with third countries, such as Switzerland and 
South Korea, after Brexit.”199
Domestic opportunities
120. There may also be opportunities to develop the UK’s domestic market. 
DAERA argued that “The UK’s exit from the EU provides opportunities 
for export growth, particularly in the GB market and to the rest of the 
world.”200 Mr Aston agreed, suggesting that the UK should use Brexit as 
an opportunity to review its status as a net importer of food: “We are only 
61% self-sufficient across the commodities and 75% self-sufficient in our 
indigenous products, so there is huge scope to make sure we provide the 
standard of product that our consumers want.” 201 Mr Smith argued: “It is 
often forgotten that the trade gap between food and drink in this country has 
doubled in real terms in the last 15 years from £5 billion to £10 billion … A 
193  European Union Committee, Brexit: trade in goods (16th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 129), 
para 231
194  Written evidence from DAERA - Northern Ireland (ABR0048)
195  Q 47
196  Q 31 and International Trade Committee, UK trade options beyond 2019 (First Report, Session 2016–
17, HC 817)
197  Q 58
198  European Union Committee, Brexit: the options for trade (5th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 72), 
para 168
199  European Union Committee, Brexit: trade in goods (16th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 129), p  5 
(Summary)
200  Written evidence from DAERA - Northern Ireland (ABR0048)
201  Q 43 
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lot of that could be grown in the UK. Our ambition as part of this process is 
to narrow that trade gap.” 202
121. However, reducing trade imbalances, as the BMPA told us, is complicated 
by a multitude of factors. They explained that exports and imports were 
about “getting value for whole carcase, cultural eating habits … the cost 
of production, which varies according to the season, the price of feed, and 
the value of sterling”.203 Therefore, they argued, finding “an outlet for 
the parts of the animal we do not eat and for which there is, therefore, no 
market in the UK—known as achieving carcase balance—and the offals and 
animal by-products is crucial.” The FUW also highlighted “the seasonality 
of production, the perishability of goods, and the degree to which sectors 
rely on exporting certain types of products and cuts (‘quarters’) which do 
not generally appeal to UK consumers”.204 All these factors would have to 
be considered when assessing whether trade could be offset with domestic 
consumption.
Non-EU trade agreements and tariffs
122. Reflecting on trade agreements with third countries, NFU Cymru told us 
that that “if the UK were to enter into trade agreements with the countries 
such as New Zealand and Brazil, then there could be a temptation on the 
part of the UK government to unilaterally lower tariffs for food imports”.205 
That, they cautioned, “would have a devastating impact on Wales’ livestock 
industry”.
123. Scottish Land & Estates also cautioned that “Trade deals that open our 
markets to cheap imports could prove disastrous for some agricultural 
sectors”.206 Mr Woolven went further: “The real nightmare scenario would 
be if we had an unlevel playing field with free trade in and then restricted 
trade out.” Therefore, he argued, there should be “at least equal tariffs in 
and out”.207
124. At the same time, as we noted above, a lower-tariff approach to trade in agri-
food products could lead to lower prices for UK consumers (see paragraphs 
36–38).
Non-EU trade agreements and standards
125. The area of most concern to our witnesses when discussing trade with third 
countries was standards. Mr Hardwick explained that “the single biggest 
obstacle in exports is … the sanitary and phytosanitary rules you have to 
meet in the importing country”.208 He gave an example: “To get the deal 
that we have with China on pork took us negotiating around seven years to 
complete because of the sanitary requirements.”209
126. Witnesses cautioned that producers in the UK—particularly meat 
producers—would be hard-pressed to compete on price. In Mr Smith’s 
words, “British farmers tend to operate to high standards, which we are very 
202  Q 47
203  Written evidence from British Meat Processors Association (ABR0041)
204  Written evidence from Farmers’ Union of Wales (ABR0045)
205  Written evidence from NFU Cymru (ABR0034)
206  Written evidence from Scottish Land & Estates (ABR0032)
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proud of, but those lead to higher costs of production than you would find 
elsewhere.”210
127. The AIC cautioned: “Whilst there have been populist claims that free trade 
will bring even cheaper food prices, the reality is that further cost reductions 
can both damage domestic production and raise the chances of quality 
and welfare issues being undermined.”211 Mr Smith agreed: “The danger 
is that we suddenly see ourselves as a new globalised player that scours the 
world for the cheapest food to feed the British population irrespective of 
the standard it is produced to.”212 The Welsh First Minister argued that “A 
key consideration is for UK producers to not be undercut by imports where 
production standards are poor, and consumers not put at risk.”213
128. Against such a backdrop Mr Wright told us that from a food and drinks 
perspective “we cannot conceive of a world in which British consumers are 
subject to lower standards. That is not acceptable either to my members 
or to anybody in the food chain and, most importantly, to the consumers 
themselves.”214 Mr Hardwick agreed: “It would be inconceivable to explain 
to British consumers that you are doing something to reduce standards.”215
129. Which? explained that maintaining current standards for products was 
“essential for consumer confidence”.216 This, they told us, means that 
“consumers can have confidence that the food they buy is safe and what 
it says it is”, which in turn “benefits the food industry which relies on 
consumers’ trust”.
130. Dr Viviane Gravey et al also reminded us that failure to uphold internationally 
defined sanitary standards would “place UK exporters at risk of trade barriers 
in export markets beyond the EU”.217 For this reason, any steps taken to 
lower domestic standards would need to respect international commitments. 
We note the Minister’s assurances that the Government intends to engage 
actively in the setting of international food safety standards in the UN system 
known as Codex, and similar fora.218
Brand Britain
131. If UK producers continue to adopt higher standards—thereby incurring 
higher costs—they will not be competitive in a global, liberalised market on 
price alone. They may, however, be able to compete on quality. Lord Forsyth 
of Drumlean, in evidence to the EU Select Committee, argued that “it is 
always possible to sell a quality product”.219
132. NFU Scotland agreed: “’Scottish is premium British’, and it is on this 
reputation of provenance and high production standards that NFUS 
sees opportunities in new export markets elsewhere in the world.”220 The 
210  Q 43 (Guy Smith)
211  Written evidence from Agricultural Industries Confederation (ABR0018)
212  Q 50
213  Written evidence from Welsh Government (ABR0050)
214  Q 54
215  Q 54
216  Written evidence from Which? (ABR0013)
217  Written evidence from Dr Viviane Gravey, Dr Brian Jack and Dr Lee McGowan (ABR0021)
218  Q 86
219  Oral evidence taken before European Union Select Committee, 6 March 2017 (Session 2016–17), 
Q 107 
220  Written evidence from NFU Scotland (ABR0007)
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National Pig Association told us that “British pork boasts the unique selling 
points of high standards of animal welfare, whole supply chain traceability 
and independently verified assurance”.221
133. Focusing on the domestic market, WWF also suggested that “adopting the 
best standards in the world would differentiate British produce from cheaper 
lower quality overseas imports whilst enhancing British food’s reputation for 
safety and quality”.222 And yet, according to Mr Smith, consumers may not 
support the costs of higher standards: “While we are always very keen to 
trade up and produce to very high standards, we are wary that sometimes in 
that scenario our consumers can let us down.”223
134. Mr Smith also noted that high domestic standards could be double-edged in 
terms of trade:
“We have an extremely robust assurance system in our agriculture that 
gives us very good food safety standards. If we can convince the Chinese 
that that gives us a premium status and they should open up their 
markets to us, we will walk through that door. If the Chinese are of the 
view they want to go for the cheapest supplier, we will have a problem in 
as much as our costs of production may well be greater.”224
Hormone-treated beef and chlorinated chicken
135. Witnesses highlighted two areas of particular concern with regard to imports: 
hormone-treated beef and chlorinated chicken. Mr Dunn argued that the 
UK should “protect” itself from products “such as chlorinated poultry or 
hormonetreated beef” in any potential trade deal with the US.225 Dr Gravey 
et al noted:
“Past negotiations between the EU and US have raised wide-spread 
concerns about agriculture—in particular facilitating the access of 
genetically modified foods, chlorine washed chickens and beef from 
cattle treated with growth promoting hormones. This is a logical 
objective for US negotiators in future UK-US deals.”226
136. Which? noted that the issue of hormone beef “illustrates different national 
approaches to ensuring food safety and standards and raises concerns 
regarding future trade deals with countries, such as Brazil or the US, once 
the UK leaves the EU”.227 These concerns, we heard, included “less rigorous 
food safety controls and, in some cases, a much more relaxed approach to 
use of ingredients or production methods that consumers are likely to have 
concerns about”. Prof Grant agreed: “I think this is an issue which consumers 
and others might be concerned about … It may be… that consumers, if they 
were aware of the way in which the beef is being produced, would not want 
to buy it, but then of course price is often a very big driver of consumer 
behaviour.”228
221  Written evidence from National Pig Association (ABR0005)
222  Written evidence from WWF (ABR0010)
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137. The Minister acknowledged this concern: “Beef produced in Brazil, Uruguay 
and the US is cheaper than in the EU and, in particular, in the UK, but 
that comes at a price of using hormones in beef and all sorts of approaches 
that probably would cause consumer reaction here, and the quality of that 
product is far inferior to what we have.”229
Box 5: The beef hormone dispute
The EU has banned the import of beef produced with certain growth hormones 
since 1989, citing concern over the risks to human health posed by hormone 
residues. The USA brought a dispute against the EU to the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body, arguing that the measures taken by the EU restricted or 
prohibited imports of meat and meat products from the United States.
The Appellate Body230 found that the European import restrictions were 
inconsistent with article 5.1 of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement 
that: “Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures 
are based on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks 
to human, animal or plant life or health, taking into account risk assessment 
techniques developed by the relevant international organizations.”
Nevertheless, the EU still upholds its ban on importing beef reared with 
hormones. By way of compensation, a higher tariff rate quota for non-hormone-
treated beef from the USA was agreed, providing improved access to the EU 
market for that beef.
 230
Source: World Trade Organization, European Communities: Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones) (2017): https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds26_e.htm [accessed 21 April 
2017]
138. The Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO), Professor Nigel Gibbens CBE, told us 
that after Brexit the UK would be “masters of our own import standards”, 
which meant that, in relation to hormone treated beef, “the UK will be at 
liberty to take up the same position [as the EU]”. He acknowledged, though, 
that:
“There is a cost to holding that position because the EU lost a WTO 
case on the basis of hormone-treated beef and continues to pay a penalty 
as a consequence, but we have that choice; we have that sovereign right. 
Again, that will apply whenever one wants to apply higher standards, 
for whatever reason, that go beyond the standards set by the standard-
setting body, in this case the OIE or Codex, or what can be scientifically 
justified so that if you want to apply a condition for trade you have to be 
able to scientifically justify it.”231
139. We note that Phil Hogan, the EU’s Agriculture Commissioner, has endorsed 
EU standards, and that it seems unlikely that the EU will be willing to 
accept hormone reared beef or chlorinated chicken after Brexit.232 Should 
such products be admitted into the UK market through trade with third 
countries, it may therefore pose a challenge to trade with the EU. We asked 
229  Q 84
230  The Appellate Body is part of the WTO dispute settlement system.
231  Q 78
232  European Commission, Keynote Address by Commissioner Phil Hogan at the 73rd FNPL Congress in 
Langres, France (March 2017): https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014–2019/hogan/
announcements/keynote–address–commissioner–phil–hogan–73rd–fnpl–congress–langres–france–
16th–march–2017_en [accessed 5 April 2017]
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the CVO about the potential difficulties of aligning third country pressure 
to allow hormone beef to enter the UK market with the EU’s continued 
reluctance to import such meat. In response, he said: “There will be a 
constant interplay between what agreements we are seeking to have, what we 
therefore commit to do and what we can do in other arenas in different free 
trade agreements.”233
Farm animal welfare standards
140. We also heard concern over farm animal welfare standards. Mr Breitmeyer 
told us:
“We are very proud of our quality and our high standards of animal 
welfare. There is significant difficulty in making sure that that is taken 
into account when it comes to any import deals that are done around the 
world, such that we are not undercut by cheaper food that is not of the 
same quality standards.”234
141. For this reason, NFU Scotland told us that “a consistent approach must 
be adopted which requires potential trade partners to produce to certain 
standards so that the UK’s very high animal welfare and traceability 
standards are not undermined”.235 Sustain agreed: “We must maintain 
and enhance the high animal welfare standards in the UK for consumer 
acceptance, biosecurity and on moral grounds. We must not cut standards to 
facilitate new trade deals.”236
142. Witnesses questioned, however, whether imports could be restricted on the 
basis of animal welfare. The CVO told us that “In WTO terms, animal 
welfare is not a legitimate barrier to trade”.237 Mr Hardwick agreed: “We will 
remain subject to WTO rules, which means that you cannot use methods of 
production as a mechanism for obstructing trade.”238
143.  Compassion in World Farming disagreed: “It is commonly assumed that 
the WTO rules do not enable restrictions to be placed on imports on animal 
welfare grounds. This, however, is to ignore WTO case law of the last sixteen 
years.”239 They continued:
“A number of WTO Panel and Appellate Body rulings suggest that a 
WTO member country may be able to require imports to meet welfare 
standards equivalent to its own provided that there is no element of 
discrimination that favours domestic producers and no discrimination 
between different would-be exporting countries.”
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144. Prof Cardwell supplied a detailed analysis of the case law, setting out the 
complexities associated with the rulings and the technical requirements that 
the UK would need to adhere to in order to restrict imports on farm animal 
welfare grounds in the absence of a free trade agreement. In summary, he 
noted:
“The extent to which WTO Members may restrict imports on the 
basis that they do not meet domestic animal welfare standards is an 
issue which remains contested … Attempts to condition imports on the 
basis of such concerns have not generally met with success before the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body, but more detailed examination of the 
decisions would indicate that the door is not necessarily closed. A key 
factor is the need to ensure that the detailed rules which are imposed do 
not result in the measures being characterised as ‘protectionist’.”240
145. Conversely, the CVO pointed out that when there is a free trade agreement in 
place “you can choose to put common or required animal welfare standards 
into those free trade agreements”.241 He added: “If the UK is seeking to 
negotiate free trade agreements you can definitely put animal welfare on the 
table.”242 Prof Swinbank concurred: “Within the framework of a free trade 
area, you may have an agreement that certain animal welfare standards are 
kept and only products that meet those can circulate within that free trade 
area.”243 Compassion in World Farming insisted that “it is vital that when 
negotiating new trade agreements, the UK insists on the inclusion of a clause 
permitting it to require imports to meet UK animal welfare standards”.244
Conclusions and recommendations
146. The EU is the UK’s biggest trading partner for agricultural and food 
products. The evidence suggests that, for a considerable period of 
time, it will not be possible to off-set this trade by increased trade 
with third countries or by expansion of domestic markets.
147. As an EU Member State, the UK has access to preferential trade 
agreements with a number of third countries. As we have concluded 
in successive reports, we doubt that UK participation in these 
agreements can be preserved after Brexit. It is essential therefore 
that the Government should, as a matter of urgency, clarify whether 
or not such agreements could indeed be grandfathered to preserve 
preferential trade arrangements for agri-food products.
148. Our witnesses were concerned that increased trade with third 
countries that operate different—often less stringent—regulatory 
standards than the UK could render UK producers uncompetitive in 
the domestic market due to an influx of cheaper products produced 
to lower standards.
149. It could also lead to increased pressure on the Government to reduce 
standards domestically in order to lower the cost of production and 
increase price competitiveness. Yet we note that UK producers are 
proud of their high standards, and that our witnesses questioned 
240  Written evidence from Prof Michael Cardwell (ABR0049)
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whether consumers would welcome such a downward trend in current 
standards.
150. In looking to expand trade in the longer term with third countries, 
such as China, we also heard that high standards were crucial to 
the British brand. The Government should therefore maintain the 
current standards to enable the export of UK food and farming 
products.
151. We welcome the Government’s commitment to maintaining high 
levels of animal welfare in the UK. There is some doubt over whether 
animal welfare can be used as a rationale to restrict imports from 
other countries under WTO rules. However, we encourage the 
Government to secure the inclusion of high farm animal welfare 
standards in any free trade agreements it negotiates after Brexit.
152. In developing new trading relations with the EU and the world, the 
Government will need to balance the sometimes conflicting needs 
and expectations of farmers, consumers and trading partners with 
respect to quality and costs.
153. It may be hard to reconcile the Government’s wish for the UK to 
become a global leader in free trade with its desire to maintain high 
quality standards for agri-food products within the UK. Striking this 
balance will require extensive consultation with both industry and 
stakeholders. We note that it will be challenging to complete such a 
consultation in the two-year period set out by Article 50.
Transitional arrangements
154. The doubts over whether the EU and the UK could reach agreement on 
a comprehensive free trade agreement within the two year period set out 
by Article 50 TEU have been widely rehearsed, as has the desirability of a 
transitional arrangement to bridge the gap between Brexit and the conclusion 
of an FTA.245 DAERA, for instance, urged that “significant thought” should 
be given to “the nature and duration of transition arrangements when it 
comes to trade.”246 Mr Dunn also argued that “we do need to ensure that we 
have a transitional agreement”, which should include “reciprocal access to 
the EU market on a free basis, as we have today, for a period of years while 
we negotiate a bespoke trade deal for the long term.”247 
155. Mr Wright told us that from the perspective of the food and drinks sector: 
“It is really important that we do not have some kind of shock on 1 April 
2019, or whenever the leave date is.”248 In his opinion, “Two years from 
now is not a long time in many business planning cycles, so the level of 
uncertainty about what that might mean is very important.” The FUW 
believed that “a transition period of ten years should be agreed, despite the 
political difficulties this may cause”.249
245  See European Union Committee, Brexit: the options for trade (5th Report, Session 2016–17, HL 
Paper 72)
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Conclusions and recommendations
156. Despite the regulatory conformity between the UK and the EU, there 
is broad consensus among experts—including those on the EU side—
that it will not be possible to negotiate and conclude a comprehensive 
free trade agreement with the EU within two years. It is therefore 
essential that the Government should agree transitional arrangements 
with the EU, in order to mitigate the potentially disastrous effects of 
trading on WTO terms on the agricultural and food sectors.
157. In our report on Brexit: trade in goods we concluded that it was 
“critical that the Government considers negotiating access to the 
EU’s preferential trade arrangements with third countries for a 
transitional period”. We reiterate that conclusion: the fact that the 
UK may not be able to grandfather existing FTAs with third countries 
makes it all the more important, particularly to the agri-food sector, 
that there should be a phased transition, so as to allow time for the 
UK to negotiate new FTAs with third countries.
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ChAPTER 4: ThE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The agriculture acquis
158. The EU’s powers to legislate in respect of agriculture are set out in Articles 
38 to 44 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU).250 These 
provide that the EU must implement a common agricultural policy that 
extends the Single Market to agriculture and trade in agricultural products. 
In designing an agricultural policy, the EU must also take into account the 
over-arching principles expressed in the Treaties regarding the protection of 
the environment and animal welfare.251
Box 6: Objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy
The objectives252 of the CAP are:
(a) to increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress 
and by ensuring the rational development of agricultural production 
and the optimum utilisation of the factors of production, in particular 
labour;
(b) thus to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, 
in particular by increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged 
in agriculture;
(c) to stabilise markets;
(d) to assure the availability of supplies;
(e) to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices.
 252
Source: Article 39(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 326 (consolidated version of 
26 October 2012)
159. Four basic Regulations underpin the CAP: rural development (Regulation 
1305/2013),253 financing, management and monitoring (Regulation 
1306/2013),254 direct payments (Regulation 1307/2013)255 and the single 
Common Market Organisation (sCMO) (Regulation 1308/2013).256 Taken 
together, the CAP, in its current form, provides an EU framework of 
250  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 326 (consolidated version of 26 October 
2012)
251  HM Government, Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European 
Union: Agriculture (2014), p 16: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/335026/agriculture–final–report.pdf [accessed 19 April 2017]
252  Compare these objectives with those set out in the Agricultural Act 1947, section 1
253  Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 of 17 December 2013 on support for rural development by the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1698/2005, OJ L 347/487 (20 December 2013) 
254  Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of 17 December 2013 on the financing, management and monitoring 
of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 352/78, (EC) No 
165/94, (EC) No 2799/98, (EC) No 814/2000, (EC) No 1290/2005 and (EC) No 485/2008, OJ L 
345/549 (20 December 2013) 
255  Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 of 17 December 2013 establishing rules for direct payments to farmers 
under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy and repealing 
Council Regulation (EC) No 637/2008 and Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009, OJ L 347/608 (20 
December 2013 
256  Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the 
markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 
234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007, OJ L 347/671 (20 December 2013) 
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regulation for direct payment support to farmers, market support measures 
and rural development programmes.257
160. As we noted above, the EU “farm-to-table” measures also regulate food safety 
and animal and plant health, creating a comprehensive body of legislation 
for food products.258
Criticisms of the Common Agricultural Policy
161. There is long-standing frustration over the rigidity of the CAP. Among 
those farmers who voted to leave the EU,259 Wesley Aston, Chief Executive 
of the Ulster Farmers’ Union, told us that one of the “main reasons” was 
“The amount of regulation that tied them up and prevented them from 
farming and getting on with the business they enjoy”.260 He gave an example: 
“There are certain dates where you are allowed to do things on one side of 
the date and not allowed to do on the other, and that just does not happen. 
Look at the weather we have had this winter time compared with what we 
had previously. Farming by calendar dates is a real problem in setting the 
EU rules.”261 Similarly, Tom Lancaster, Agricultural Policy Officer at the 
RSPB, said that “there are elements … that are very bureaucratic. A lot of 
that though flows from European requirements, such as the record keeping, 
the single annual start date, various other points of detail.”262 NFU Cymru 
agreed: “Brexit offers considerable opportunity to reduce the regulatory 
burden under which our farmers currently operate.”263
162. From a food and drinks perspective, Ian Wright, Director General of the 
FDF, cited general frustration with the amount of time that it takes to 
develop regulations within the EU: “Because of the process of having to go 
through the Commission, the Parliament, and so on, there is the danger that 
some developments which are technically possible take longer because you 
have to go through a process of approval by 28 Member States.”264
163. The Agricultural Industries Confederation (AIC) concluded that “exiting 
the CAP gives the UK opportunity to structure domestic policy so that it is 
in line with both UK agriculture and UK conditions … An appropriate level 
of flexibility can be written into a domestic policy much more easily than on 
an EU wide basis.”265
164. The Minister, George Eustice MP, agreed, arguing that a “prescriptive, 
centralised, pan-European policy is never going to work well”, and that “the 
golden opportunity with Brexit is the chance to do policy better”.266
257  House of Commons Library, Brexit: impact across policy areas, Briefing Paper 07213, August 2016, 
p 52
258  European Commission, ‘Food safety: overview’, (April 2017): http://ec.europa.eu/food/overview_en 
[accessed 21 April 2017]
259  One NFU survey suggested that approximately 40% of NFU members voted to leave (Guy Smith, 
Q 43).
260  Q 43
261  Q 44
262  Q 61
263  Written evidence from NFU Cymru (ABR0034)
264  Q 54
265  Written evidence from Agricultural Industries Confederation (ABR0018)
266  Q 91
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Potential improvements
165. Guy Smith, Vice President of the National Farmers’ Union (NFU), told us 
that “there are many aspects of EU regulation we would like to see reformed 
… that we find are crude and clunky and do not address the problems they 
are trying to address”.267 The NFU subsequently gave examples of such 
“burdensome” EU regulations, including the Water Framework Directive 
(on the grounds that it is complex and can restrict growth),268 the Nitrates 
Directive (as overly prescriptive and inflexible, imposing high costs to 
agriculture),269 and neonicotinoid restrictions (as not based on sound 
scientific evidence).270 The FUW sought a review of “those areas which are 
most costly and disproportionate and frequently result in punitive sanctions 
for farmers”, such as “Nitrate Vulnerable Zones; Environmental Impact 
Assessment requirements; animal movement recording and reporting; 
and fallen stock burial—all of which could be improved and made more 
proportionate without compromising overarching objectives”.271
166. As an example, witnesses expressed an interest in amending the three-crop 
rule.272 Tim Breitmeyer, Deputy President of the CLA, told us that this rule 
“was brought in … to get rid of the monocropping of crops in Europe, in 
particular. It does not fit our farming model at all well here.”273 Wyn Grant, 
Emeritus Professor of Politics at the University of Warwick, agreed, calling it 
a “blunt instrument … One would want to see regulations like that disappear 
as soon as they possibly could, or at least be substantially modified.”274 In 
a speech to the Oxford Farming Conference on 4 January 2017, Secretary 
of State, Rt Hon Andrea Leadsom MP, similarly identified the “ridiculous, 
bureaucratic three-crop rule” as a candidate for “scrapping the rules that 
hold us back”.275
167. Another recurring theme was for the UK to move to a more risk-based 
approach to plant protection product (PPP) regulation.276 The European 
Union takes a ‘precautionary approach’ to regulating chemicals, which 
emphasises the hazard of a given substance to human and animal health. 
Mr Breitmeyer believed that “the principle of risk, backed up by good 
science, is just as good a principle to adhere to”.277 The Crop Protection 
Association agreed: “The use of hazard criteria for regulation of pesticides 
should not be retained by the UK following exit from the EU as it limits the 
range of pesticides available to growers and farmers without any concomitant 
267  Q 44
268  Council Directive 2000/60/EC of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in 
the field of water policy, OJ L 327 (22 December 2000), pp 0001–0073
269  Council Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991 concerning the protection of waters against 
pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources, OJ L 375 (31 December 1991), pp 0001–0008
270  Supplementary written evidence from NFU (ABR0042)
271  Written evidence from Farmers’ Union of Wales (ABR0045)
272  This rule, officially the CAP’s “crop diversification measure”, requires farmers with over 10 hectares 
of arable land to grow at least two or three crops, depending on the size of their land.
273  Q 26
274  Q 3; also Q 26 (George Dunn)
275  Environment secretary Andrea Leadsom MP, Speech setting out ambition for food and farming 
industry, 4 January 2017: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/environment–secretary–sets–out–
ambition–for–food–and–farming–industry [accessed 23 March 2017]
276  Before a plant protection product (or pesticide) can be used in the EU, it must be scientifically evaluated 
by its manufacturer. The European Food Safety Agency (EFSA) then conducts an assessments of that 
evaluation at the European level, based on which the European Commission proposes approval or 
non-approval to the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health. Member States in 
that Standing Committee must ultimately vote on the approval for a pesticide at the EU level.
277  Q 24
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improvement in protection of either human health or the environment.”278 
Nabim also favoured “the adoption of a greater degree of pragmatism around 
such issues as the very low level presence of some contaminants where an 
independent assessment shows little or no risk”.279 This view was supported 
by a number of other witnesses.280
168. The UK Pesticides Campaign countered that “The only real solution to 
eliminate all adverse health and environmental impacts of pesticides is 
to take a preventative approach and avoid exposure altogether”,281 while 
Tom MacMillan, Director of Innovation at the Soil Association, pointed out 
that “On something like endocrine disruptors, where effectively there is no 
safe threshold that can be defined, a hazard-based approach is the same as 
a risk-based approach”.282 Fergus Ewing MSP, of the Scottish Government, 
believed that “Adopting the EU’s regulatory regime would minimise the risk 
of reducing pesticide availability in Scotland unnecessarily, and the risk of 
barriers to trade in foodstuffs produced using pesticides”.283
169. One area in which witnesses did not wish to see regulatory changes was in 
relation to animal welfare.284 As we noted in Chapter 3, farm animal welfare 
may be a key element of post-Brexit trade agreements. We have explored this 
issue in more detail in a short inquiry into Brexit and farm animal welfare, 
which we expect to resume early in the new Parliament.
Constraints
170. Although there may be significant opportunities to review the legislative 
framework underpinning agriculture in the UK, we heard that the scope for 
deregulation may be limited. In the words of George Dunn, Chief Executive 
of the TFA: “We cannot rush to a bonfire of the regulations on day one.”285 
The Agricultural Industries Confederation (AIC) also told us that, as a 
point of principle, they would “question whether anyone involved in the 
agricultural sector is looking for the UK Government to diminish or weaken 
the regulatory framework”.286 The CVO reminded us that “We will still be 
operating globally, so we will always have reference back to the international 
standard”,287 and Dr Viviane Gravey, Dr Brian Jack and Dr Lee McGowan 
from Queen’s University Belfast noted that “what farmers want will have to 
be balanced out with consumer demands and with the influence of the UK 
environmental movement”.288
171. There is also a risk that regulatory simplification could create non-tariff 
barriers to trade, as discussed in Chapter 3. Mr Smith hoped that “we could 
do a deal with the European Union whereby we are allowed to take back 
some of the regulation of our industry and continue to trade with them freely, 
278  Written evidence from Crop Protection Association (ABR0026)
279  Written evidence from nabim (ABR0028)
280  Q 44 (Guy Smith), written evidence from British Growers Association (ABR0036) and Agricultural 
Industries Confederation (ABR0018)
281  Written evidence from the UK Pesticides Campaign (ABR0031)
282  Q 24
283  Written evidence from Scottish Government (ABR0052)
284  See for instance Q 29 (Tim Breitmeyer), written evidence from the National Pig Association 
(ABR0005)
285  Q 24
286  Written evidence from Agricultural Industries Confederation (ABR0018)
287  Q 73
288  Written evidence from Dr Viviane Gravey, Dr Brian Jack and Dr Lee McGowan (ABR0021)
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but that is a big political ask”.289 He conceded that in advocating a free trade 
agreement with the EU, he was “walking into a lot of EU Regulation which 
I said I wanted to move away from”, but hoped that it would be possible “to 
have a nuanced British-type policy and continued access”.290
172. Again, pesticides illustrate this difficulty. Alan Swinbank, Emeritus Professor 
of Agricultural Economics at the University of Reading, told us: “Any product 
that goes into an overseas market has to meet the product specification of 
that market. If that relates to pesticide residues or some other such matter 
which relates to the product as such, then farmers and processors would still 
have to abide by those regulations.”291
173. Moreover, agreed international standards, for example those set by Codex, 
and WTO agreements, such as the SPS and TBT agreements (see Box 3), 
establish regulation that applies to trade agreements internationally. These 
will apply to trade in agri-food with any third country, and will thus constrain 
the UK’s regulatory freedom to some extent. If WTO member states want 
to adopt higher standards than those agreed internationally, those standards 
must comply with the rules of the SPS and TBT Agreements. In the case 
that the EU has implemented higher standards, the UK could choose to 
operate a two-tier set of regulations: one for products destined for the EU 
and one for products destined elsewhere. We explored this possibility in our 
report Brexit: trade in goods, where we noted that “a ‘two-tier’ approach to 
regulation of the food and beverages sector post-Brexit appears undesirable 
and unlikely”.292 This was due to the potential detrimental effect a two-
tier system could have for the reputation of British food and agricultural 
products, and the difficulty associated with operating a two-tier regulatory 
system in, say, a meat plant, where different parts of the animal may be 
destined for different markets. We concluded: “Operating to two separate 
regulatory standards—for the domestic and EU markets—would be costly 
for UK businesses.”293
 Conclusions and recommendations
174. Brexit presents a new and important opportunity to replace elements 
of EU agricultural regulation that are bureaucratic, ineffective or ill-
tailored to farming conditions in the UK, for example the three-crop 
rule and farming by calendar dates.
175. Any regulatory change will have to strike a balance between managing 
international obligations, consumer and public demands, costs for 
producers, and the conditions of any trade agreements.
176. Significant divergence between the regulatory frameworks in the 
UK and the EU, by creating non-tariff barriers, could make it more 
difficult to continue to trade agri-food products after Brexit. As we 
noted in our report Brexit: trade in goods, a FTA with the EU is likely 
to require a legal commitment by the UK to maintain a high level of 
289  Q 47
290  Q 47
291  Q 3; also written evidence from Sustain (ABR0003) and supplementary written evidence from IGD 
(ABR0043).
292 European Union Committee, Brexit: trade in goods (16th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 129), 
para 155
293  European Union Committee, Brexit: trade in goods (16th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 129), 
para 184
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harmonisation or mutual recognition of regulations and standards 
with the EU. The scope for deregulation, while not negligible, may 
therefore be limited.
Devolution
177. Although a single UK position on agriculture is presented in negotiations 
at the EU level, agricultural policy within the UK is devolved: Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland are responsible for the implementation of CAP 
legislation in their respective territories. The CAP allows some flexibility 
in implementation, which has led to a number of differences in the current 
implementation arrangements within the UK.294
178. The wider issue of the impact of Brexit upon the devolution settlements is 
being addressed in the European Union Committee’s inquiry on Brexit: 
devolution.295 In the following paragraphs we limit ourselves to addressing 
these issues in the context of agriculture.
Potential pan-UK policy framework
179. The key challenge will be to maintain the necessary degree of consistency 
across the UK while respecting diverse regional and local circumstances. 
Dr Gravey et al told us:
“A first critical decision will be constitutional: how will the UK share 
its competence regarding agriculture policy: what will be done by the 
devolved administrations, what will be done centrally and how will these 
be coordinated (e.g. to avoid misfits between UK trade and agricultural 
policy in the devolved administration).”296
According to Dr Alan Greer, Associate Professor in Politics and Public Policy 
at UWE Bristol, farmers’ unions support “some sort of common UK-wide 
policy that minimises unfair competition and protects free trade and level 
playing fields, while allowing some room for flexibility and differentiation to 
permit the devolved administrations to make decisions that are appropriate 
for their conditions and circumstances”.297
180. NFU Scotland, while acknowledging that “significantly divergent agricultural 
policies across the UK” would be undesirable, and could create distortion, 
considered that “the Scottish Government having the power to apply the 
policy to best fit the needs of the Scottish farmers and crofters it serves is 
sensible and proper.”298 They also questioned “how pesticides, chemicals, 
plant protection and animal welfare in particular will be regulated on a pan-
UK basis”.299
181. Rt Hon Carwyn Jones AM, the First Minister of Wales, told us: “It is vital 
devolution is fully respected and the ability devolved administrations have to 
294  HM Government, Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European 
Union: Agriculture, (2014), p 19: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/335026/agriculture–final–report.pdf [accessed 19 April 2017]
295  European Union Select Committee, ‘Brexit: devolution’: http://www.parliament.uk/business/
committees/committees–a–z/lords–select/eu–select–committee–/inquiries/parliament–2015/brexit–
devolution [accessed 25 April 2017]
296 Written evidence from Dr Viviane Gravey, Dr Brian Jack and Dr Lee McGowan (ABR0021)
297  Written evidence from Dr Alan Greer (ABR0014)
298  Written evidence from NFU Scotland (ABR0007)
299  Written evidence from NFU Scotland (ABR0007)
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tailor policy in devolved areas to our very different contexts is not restricted.”300 
He continued:
“We have acknowledged the need for UK Frameworks in some areas 
to replace those currently set by the EU, however, these should be 
collectively developed and agreed, based on common consent by all 
four Governments within the UK, and not imposed … there is a clear 
need for new governance arrangements to support how the UK will 
collectively deliver on international agreements or obligations.”301
182. We heard from DAERA, writing in March 2017, that “in the current 
absence of a Northern Ireland Assembly, Brexit remains a priority. Work 
continues to ensure we replace the Common Agricultural Policy” with an 
“appropriate” UK framework, to underpin “the sustainable growth and 
competitiveness” of the agri-food sector, and to “safeguard our continued 
ability to trade effectively and profitably both inwardly and outwardly”.302 
DAERA added: “Northern Ireland will look for sufficient flexibility within 
the framework offered to enable the policy interventions to be tailored to the 
unique circumstances of this region.”
183. Asked whether the CAP should be replaced with a UK-wide framework 
policy for farming, Mr Ewing, of the Scottish Government, answered: 
“No. Agriculture and rural policy are fully devolved areas and the Scottish 
Government must retain its powers to manage policy and determine funding 
levels appropriately.”303 He added: “If there is a need to develop a common 
UK framework in specific areas of policy, this can be achieved through 
agreement and negotiation.”
Implications for trade
184. In the absence of the coordination provided by the CAP, or a cohesive UK 
successor policy, the divergence of agricultural policies across the UK could 
cause problems for the UK’s internal single market as well as for international 
trade. In the words of Mr Wright, “At the moment we have a Single Market in 
regulation here in the UK … sort of imposed by our membership of the EU. 
After we have exited … we will, in effect, have three or four markets because 
the regulatory framework is different in each of the devolved nations.”304
185. Illustrating this potential divergence within the UK agri-food market, 
Professor Joseph McMahon, Dean of the Sunderland School of Law at 
University College Dublin, pointed out that approval of genetically modified 
(GM) organisms was a devolved matter: “Both Northern Ireland and 
Scotland have indicated that they wish to be GM-free, which would suggest 
that if, for example, England and Wales were to declare that they wanted 
to be GM-friendly, there is the possibility of having to have border checks 
within the UK to ensure that you are not importing GM food.”305
186. Dr Greer focused on the tension between devolution and international trade 
and competition policy, “matters that are reserved to the ‘UK’ government, 
but which nonetheless have major implications for the exercise of devolved 
300  Written evidence from Welsh Government (ABR0050)
301  Written evidence from Welsh Government (ABR0050)
302  Written evidence from DAERA - Northern Ireland (ABR0048)
303  Written evidence from Scottish Government (ABR0052)
304  Q 51
305  Q 34
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powers”.306 This would create its own pressures: “Because of the need to 
maintain valuable export markets there will be pressures to align regulations 
and standards closely to those in force in the EU, and/or there will be 
limitations imposed by WTO rules in cases where these apply directly.”307
Government commitments
187. The Minister told us: “We are not going to take away from the devolved 
Administrations any of the decision-making powers they currently have 
within the context of the EU system.”308 He also stated: “I think there is 
a consensus, particularly among the industry, that you need some kind of 
UK framework, but within that you want to make sure that the devolved 
Administrations have the freedom to pursue policies that work for them as 
well.”309
188. We note that the Government’s white paper, Legislating for the United 
Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, states:
“Examples of where common UK frameworks may be required include 
where they are necessary to protect the freedom of businesses to operate 
across the UK single market and to enable the UK to strike free trade 
deals with third countries … It is the expectation of the Government 
that the outcome of [the Great Repeal Bill process] will be a significant 
increase in the decision making power of each devolved administration.”310
Conclusions and recommendations
189. Farming landscapes vary significantly across the UK, and agriculture 
is rightly a devolved policy area. Though implementation of CAP 
policies already varies, Brexit will allow the devolved administrations 
to tailor agriculture policies even more closely to their farmers and 
land.
190. But the UK has an internal single market, in which agri-food plays a 
significant role. It is in the interest of all in the agri-food sector, as well 
as of consumers, that the integrity of the UK market be preserved. 
This will require either a UK-wide framework or the negotiation of 
co-ordinated agricultural policies by the UK Government and the 
Devolved Administrations. We encourage the Government to pursue 
dialogue on this issue as a matter of urgency.
191. Trade policy is a reserved matter, so the sum of agricultural policy 
across the UK must respect the UK’s external trade commitments. 
The UK Government will need to work closely with the Devolved 
Administrations to ensure that this is the case.
Regulatory transfer
192. Once the UK withdraws from the EU, competence over agricultural policy 
will revert to the UK. Some witnesses told us a period of transition would 
306  Written evidence from Dr Alan Greer (ABR0014)
307  Written evidence from Dr Alan Greer (ABR0014)
308  Q 89
309  Q 82
310  Department for Exiting the European Union, Legislating for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from 
the European Union, Cm 9446, March 2017, p 28: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/604514/Great_repeal_bill_white_paper_print.pdf [accessed 6 April 
2017]
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be needed to achieve this transfer. From a food and drinks perspective, the 
FDF supported “the effective transfer of EU regulatory requirements to 
the UK in the immediate post-exit phase … to provide stability, continued 
access to EU markets and to maintain consumer confidence”.311 The RSPB 
agreed: “The first step must be to retain existing regulations through the 
Great Repeal Bill in order to retain the protections that these provide.”312
193. Some witnesses qualified this position. For example, the National Sheep 
Association supported the principle of the Great Repeal Bill only “as long 
as this is not a permanent situation and specific policies are revisited in the 
near future”.313 Similarly, Farmwel argued: “The Great Repeal Bill should 
be used to transfer all EU law to the UK, after which industry-specific bills 
should be used to propose and scrutinise material changes.”314
194. As we noted in our report Brexit: environment and climate change, transferring 
regulations by the means of the Great Repeal Bill will be a complex 
undertaking.315 Pamela Thompson, Head of the EU Exit Team for Animal 
and Plant Health at Defra, spoke to this complexity, telling us:
“Quite a considerable proportion of the Defra legislative framework is in 
the animal and plant health and animal welfare area, about a third of the 
whole of the department’s legislation. We have been through everything, 
we have looked at how operable it would be, we have identified areas that 
would not be operable and we have plans in place to deal with those.”316
195. As we have noted, devolution, and the differences of view on the extent to 
which responsibility for agriculture will be devolved, could create further 
complications, legal and political. As Dr Greer told us:
“The Scottish government is clear in its white paper that any decisions 
about devolved matters as a result of the Great Repeal Bill such as in 
agricultural policy (or if the effect of the Bill is to take powers back to 
Westminster) will require the consent of the Scottish parliament under 
the Sewel Convention. Apart from the legal complexities, the main 
problems are likely to be political, especially if the introduction of the 
Great Repeal Bill alters current understandings about the nature and 
extent of devolved powers in agriculture.”317
196. The Minister noted that legislative action would be needed in the Devolved 
Administrations as well:
“Some of the EU Directives and EU Regulations that we are pulling 
across through the Great Repeal Bill will require the Welsh Assembly and 
the Scottish Parliament to do something similar in their own legislatures 
to bring some of those across. So there is an enormous amount of joint 
working going on on that very technical exercise.”318
311  Supplementary written evidence from Food and Drink Federation (ABR0044) 
312  Written evidence from RSPB (ABR0009); also NFU Cymru (ABR0034), Scottish Land & Estates 
(ABR0032) and Q 72 (Prof Nigel Gibbens)
313  Written evidence from National Sheep Association (ABR0025)
314  Written evidence from Scottish Land & Estates (ABR0032); also The Food Foundation (ABR0030), 
Q 16 (Tim Breitmeyer) and Q 72 (Pamela Thompson)
315  European Union Committee, Brexit: environment and climate change (12th Report, Session 2016–17, 
HL Paper 109), p 22
316  Q 72
317  Written evidence from Dr Alan Greer (ABR0014)
318  Q 82
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197. Mr Lancaster identified a further layer of complexity, namely that the scope 
of the transfer of agricultural regulations should extend to the principles 
that underpin such regulation, such as “the polluter pays principle, the 
precautionary principle, the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 
and the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive”.319 His argument 
was that “These apply to the way legislation is developed, which make 
legislators take account of the impact on the environment when legislating 
in other areas. We would want to see those hard-wired into UK legislation.” 
Similarly, Compassion in World Farming argued in favour of retaining the 
principle that animals are sentient beings.320
198. NFU Cymru focused on the way regulation changed over time, noting that 
the transferred legislation “will be rendered static, and will slowly start to date. 
Should post-Brexit trading arrangements require that the UK and Wales be 
observant of much EU law, then this presents a potential problem.”321 They 
noted that if the Government decided to continue to shadow developments 
in EU legislation to enable trade with the EU, this would “give rise to a 
significant and ultimately open ended task”.
199. The Minister identified two potential approaches to establishing agricultural 
regulations in the UK after Brexit, though he did not state a preference for 
either:
“The options range from bringing big elements of the Common 
Agricultural Policy across through the Great Repeal Bill and having, 
effectively, a sort of rolling forward in the interim until we have planned 
what we want to do. That is one option. The other option would be to 
try to do something a little more radical and go for primary legislation 
in a shorter timeframe so that we had something that could come in 
new from 2020, which might look quite different from the CAP or, 
indeed, might be on a trajectory to something different but would start 
by looking quite like the CAP and morph into a new UK policy.”322
Conclusions and recommendations
200. We heard strong support for the Government’s approach of an initial 
transfer of EU agri-food regulations into UK law via the Great Repeal 
Bill, followed by a considered review of where improvements could be 
made.
201. We welcome the groundwork already completed in relation to 
transferring EU legislation on animal welfare and plant health into 
UK law, and invite the Government to confirm that the same process 
will soon be completed in relation to other aspects of agricultural 
legislation.
Institutional governance
202. In our report Brexit: environment and climate change, we noted that EU 
environmental law does not stand alone: its implementation is monitored 
and enforced by EU institutions. The same applies to the agricultural sector. 
As Peter Hardwick, Head of Exports at the AHDB, noted, “at some stage 
319  Q 70
320  Written evidence from Compassion in World Farming (ABR0004)
321  Written evidence from NFU Cymru (ABR0034); also Welsh Government (ABR0050)
322  Q 82 
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in the regulation or piece of legislation there is an intervening European 
regulatory body involved”.323 The CVO confirmed that “We do relate to a 
number of EU bodies across the area of health and welfare, which gives us 
strength … we are part of a network of laboratories that provide very high 
levels of diagnostic capability. That gives us surveillance at EU level and 
connectivity across the world.”324 The CVO concluded that it would be in the 
UK’s interest to maintain that connectivity. The National Office of Animal 
Health (NOAH) also raised coordination with EU agencies as an important 
issue: “Co-operation with EU regulators on the policing and enforcement of 
the [veterinary medicines] rules will need careful consideration.”325
203. One key EU regulator is the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), 
and Prof McMahon told us: “I would hope that the UK would become an 
observer at the EFSA and its bodies in much the same way as Switzerland 
is an observer in those bodies.”326 In contrast, Alan Matthews, Professor 
Emeritus of Agricultural Economics at Trinity College Dublin, stated: “You 
would want to establish close links, and there may be ways of doing that, 
but I do not see the UK remaining a member of the EFSA and being able to 
participate in its work directly.”327
204. In Chapter 3 we noted the administrative challenges associated with the 
control of standards and trade in agricultural products. Which? emphasised 
that “An effective enforcement regime must be in place to ensure compliance 
with these standards, so that consumers have confidence in the products that 
they buy”.328 They further noted that the European Commission currently 
played a key role in conducting such checks: “The European Commission 
(DG Sante) has dedicated inspectors in third countries that the EU imports 
from who check facilities and help ensure compliance with EU laws. Outside 
of the single market, the UK … would also need to step up its own checks, 
both on exports and on imports.”
205. Mr Dunn concluded: “We certainly need to be scoping out what new 
institutions and what new bodies we need to ensure there is adequate 
governance for this new body of legislation that we are going to be inheriting.”329
206. The Minister said he was considering options including a transitional 
period, where the UK continued to work with EU agencies, or establishing 
UK agencies: “Although the latter would require some beefing up of some of 
the agencies we have now, it is certainly not beyond the wit of man to do … 
We have all of the infrastructure and the expertise, so we would simply be 
changing the scope of their role slightly.”330
Conclusions and recommendations
207. EU agricultural regulation is underpinned by European institutions 
that monitor and enforce much of the legislative framework and 
international commitments. The Government will need to either 
ensure that these institutions’ roles can be carried out by independent 
323  Q 52
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325  Written evidence from National Office of Animal Health (ABR0011)
326  Q 39
327  Q 39
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domestic bodies, or negotiate enduring relationships with the EU 
agencies and entities to ensure high standards of food safety and 
quality after Brexit.
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ChAPTER 5: WIThDRAWING FROM CAP FINANCIAL 
SUPPORT
Financial support
208. The CAP provides direct financial support to farmers in the UK through the 
Basic Payment Scheme (BPS), also known as Pillar I, and to the wider rural 
economy through Pillar II funding for Rural Development Programmes.331
Box 7: CAP financial support
Pillar I support, also known as direct payments or the Basic Payment Scheme 
(BPS), consists of payments made directly to farmers. They are mainly granted 
in the form of an area-based basic income support, which is decoupled from 
agricultural production. The aim of the payment is to stabilise farmers’ income 
in a market subject to volatility. Direct payments also contribute to the provision 
of public goods, with 30% of each EU country’s direct payment budget being 
directed towards greening measures.332 Farmers must meet so-called Cross 
Compliance rules on animal husbandry and farm management to receive direct 
payments.
Pillar II support, also known as Rural Development Programmes, supports 
agri-environment schemes and rural growth. Pillar II funding is co-financed by 
national governments. At least 30% of Member State rural development funding 
must be spent on measures related to land management and climate change.
 332
Source: House of Commons Library “EU Referendum: impact on UK Agriculture Policy”, Briefing paper 7602, 
2016, p 7: http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP–7602/CBP–7602.pdf
209. The total CAP represents over 36% of the EU budget over the Multiannual 
Financial Framework (MFF) for 2014–2020.333 The UK is expected to 
receive €25.1 billion in direct payments (Pillar I) and €2.6 billion in rural 
development funds (Pillar II) for rural development and the environment 
over the course of that MFF period.334
210. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP, has 
guaranteed that “all structural and investment fund projects, including agri-
environment schemes, signed before the Autumn Statement will be fully 
funded, even when these projects continue beyond the UK’s departure from 
the EU”.335 The Chancellor has also guaranteed that the current levels of 
Pillar I funding will be upheld until 2020.
331  House of Commons Library, Brexit: impact across policy areas, Briefing Paper 07213, August 2016, 
p 53 
332  The 2013 CAP reform redesigned the structure of direct payments by incorporating a greening 
component. This rewards farmers for adopting and maintaining a more sustainable use of agricultural 
land and aims to enhance the CAP’s environmental performance. Green direct payments account for 
30% of Member States’ direct payment budgets. European Commission, ‘Greening’ (2017): https://
ec.europa.eu/agriculture/direct–support/greening_en [accessed 21 April 2017]
333  HM Government, Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European 
Union: Agriculture (2014), p 37: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/335026/agriculture–final–report.pdf [accessed 19 April 2017]
334  House of Commons Library, Brexit: impact across policy areas, Briefing Paper 07213, August 2016, 
p 53 
335  HM Government, Chancellor Philip Hammond guarantees EU funding beyond date UK leaves the EU, 
13 August 2016: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/chancellor–philip–hammond–guarantees–eu–
funding–beyond–date–uk–leaves–the–eu [accessed 21 April 2017]
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Reliance on funding
211. Dr Alan Greer, Associate Professor in Politics and Public Policy at UWE 
Bristol, outlined UK farmers’ reliance upon CAP payments:
“It has been estimated that EU subsidies make up between 50 and 60 
per cent of farm income in the UK as a whole. However it is estimated 
that 87 per cent of total farming income in Northern Ireland, 80 per cent 
in Wales, and three quarters of total income from farming in Scotland is 
contributed by CAP payments.”336
Table 1: CAP allocations in the UK 2014–2020
Pillar I
€ million 
(approximate 
number, non-
inflation 
adjusted)
% share Pillar II
€ million 
(approximate 
number, non-
inflation 
adjusted)
% share
England 16,421 65.5 1,520 58.9
Northern 
Ireland
2,299 9.2 227 8.8
Scotland 4,096 16.3 478 18.5
Wales 2,245 8.96 355 13.7
Total UK 25.1 billion 2.6 billion
Source: House of Commons Library, Brexit: impact across policy areas, Briefing Paper 07213, August 2016, p 54
212. As well as varying between the nations of the UK, reliance on financial 
support varies across farming sectors. According to the Wildfowl and 
Wetlands Trust, the pig, poultry and horticulture sectors earn income from 
farming alone, whereas “Arable farms, grazing livestock and mixed farms 
all relied on subsidy for 90–166% of their farm business income”.337 NFU 
Scotland stated: “In the [Scottish] dairy sector, CAP support payments 
made up 55 per cent of Farm Business Income (FBI)338 in 2016; whereas for 
the non-specialist Less Favoured Area cattle and sheep sector, CAP support 
was 231 per cent of FBI.”339
213. Financial support is particularly salient in those regions regarded as “less 
favoured” areas.340 The Wildlife Trust stated that “In most upland areas 
farm subsidies represent over half of farm income and farming businesses 
would be unlikely to survive in their current form without continued direct 
336  Written evidence from Dr Alan Greer (ABR0014)
337  Written evidence from Wildfowl and Wetlands Trust (ABR0022)
338  Farm Business Income is the average headline business-level measure of farm income in the UK. FBI 
represents the return to the whole farm business, that is, the total income available to all unpaid labour 
and their capital invested in the business. Returns from diversified activities (non-agricultural activities 
that use farm resources, for example: renting out farm cottages for tourism; income from small-medium 
scale wind turbines; etc.) are included in overall FBI. Scottish Government, Annual Estimates of Scottish 
Farm Business Income (FBI), (March 2016): http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2016/03/7764/326289 
[accessed 25 April 2017]
339  Written evidence from NFU Scotland (ABR0007)
340  In the EU, “less-favoured area” is a term used to describe an area with natural handicaps (lack of 
water, climate, short crop season and tendencies of depopulation), or that is mountainous or hilly, as 
defined by its altitude and slope.
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support”.341 Richard Hebditch, External Affairs Director at the National 
Trust, told us that “The end of CAP will be a very significant change … 
particularly [for] those upland farmers or coastal farmers in less favourable 
areas, where they are very reliant on farming”.342
214. It is not surprising therefore that the financial support given to the agricultural 
sector is vital to rural economies. The National Sheep Association told us: 
“There is a ‘multiplier effect’ created by farmers in receipt of CAP payments, 
as they support a wide range of other rural businesses … providing rural 
employment and positively impacting on socio- economic factors.”343 Mr 
Fenwick agreed: “We are looking at complete rural collapse if funding is not 
maintained.”344
Funding in the context of Brexit
215. Given the significance of financial support to the agricultural industry, 
farmers’ unions were particularly emphatic about the need to clarify the post-
CAP future of that support. Wesley Aston, Chief Executive of the Ulster 
Farmers’ Union, told us: “We have a commitment on funding from the UK 
Government for the year post Brexit as such, but it is beyond that that is the 
real issue.”345 The FUW agreed:
“A major impact for FUW members in the short and medium term is 
the inability to adequately plan and prepare for the future in terms of 
decisions relating to changes to business models, finance, borrowing and 
succession. Such problems are compounded by the periods over which 
farmers need to plan, given, for instance, gestation and maturation 
periods of livestock.”346
Devon County Council reflected the same concern: “This uncertainty has 
left farmers unable to plan for the future and has put increased strain on 
farming families and businesses who are finding it difficult to stay afloat 
even with the support of the BPS.”347
216. The Minister responded: “We will make sure that we make our intentions 
clear to farmers well in advance of the end of the current schemes, so that 
they know where we are heading.”348
Level of funding
217. Tim Breitmeyer, Deputy President of the CLA, told us that a future policy 
for agriculture should be “fully funded”.349 George Dunn, Chief Executive 
of the TFA, agreed that “We … would certainly be arguing for the budget 
to be maintained.”350
341  Written evidence from Woodland Trust (ABR0023)
342  Q 59
343  Written evidence from National Sheep Association (ABR0025)
344  Oral evidence taken before the European Union Committee, 7 February 2017 (Session 2016–17), 
Q 87 
345  Q 43
346  Written evidence from Farmers’ Union of Wales (ABR0045)
347  Written evidence from Devon County Council (ABR0016)
348  Q 81
349  Q 12 
350  Q 14
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218. Some witnesses questioned whether the UK Government would match the 
current levels of financial support to farmers after Brexit.351 Mr Hebditch 
reflected this concern: “It is very tempting for the Treasury every year where 
there is a funding shortfall to look at taking a bit out of whatever replaces 
the Common Agricultural Policy in England.”352 Addressing support for 
environmental protection in particular, Tom Lancaster, Agricultural Policy 
Officer at the RSPB, told us it would be important to “construct a case that 
we can sell to the Treasury and other government departments we need to 
convince of the case for investing in this area”.353
Funding objectives
219. As we have noted, a key opportunity arising from Brexit is that of designing 
an agricultural policy, including support measures, tailored to the UK.354 
While many believed the quantum of funding should remain at current 
levels, views on the future objectives of that funding differed.
220. For instance, witnesses differed on the merits of Pillar I-style direct payments, 
as opposed to Pillar II-style rural development programmes. Dr Greer 
noted that “the devolved governments and farmers’ organisations like direct 
payments and advocate their retention”,355 while Mr Lancaster stated:
“I think there is a lot to learn from Pillar II-type measures, in that they 
are contractual, targeted, and outcome-focused—the expenditure is 
related to those outcomes, typically through a proxy of actions. When 
you compare that to Pillar I, which is entitlement-based, untargeted, 
inefficient, and there is no link between outcomes and payments, clearly 
Pillar II is the model we would want to adopt.”356
221. In our 2016 report Responding to price volatility: creating a more resilient 
agricultural sector we concluded: “Given that the agricultural sector is often 
expected to provide public goods, there is a case for financial support in 
certain circumstances. However, policy should display much more explicit 
links between the expected outcomes and the use of public funds.”357 We see 
no reason to change that view in the wake of the referendum.
Environmental public goods and ecosystems services
222. Public goods are those which are non-excludable (if the good is available 
to one person, others are not thereby excluded from its benefits) and non-
rival (if the good is consumed by one person it does not reduce the amount 
available to others).358 These characteristics mean that their supply cannot be 
351  The House of Commons Library has noted that “UK governments have consistently sought to reduce 
the overall CAP budget and levels of direct subsidies, and to ensure that direct subsidies are linked to 
the delivery of wider public goods such as environmental protection to give value for money to the tax 
payer”. House of Commons Library, Brexit: impact across policy areas, Briefing Paper 07213, August 
2016, p 53
352  Q 61
353  Q 65
354  See for example Q 12 (Tim Breitmeyer), written evidence from NFU Scotland (ABR0007) and Welsh 
Government (ABR0050) 
355  Written evidence from Dr Alan Greer (ABR0014)
356  Q 60
357  European Union Committee, Responding to price volatility: creating a more resilient agricultural sector 
(15th Report, Session 2015–16, HL Paper 146), para 271
358  Institute for European Environmental Policy, Provision of Public Goods through Agriculture in the 
European Union (December 2009): http://www.ieep.eu/assets/457/final_pg_report.pdf [accessed 4 
April 2017]
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secured through markets, because users have no incentive to pay for them: as 
a result, public intervention is needed to achieve their provision. Many of the 
public goods provided by agriculture are environmental.
223. The Minister told us that “rewarding farmers for what they do for the 
environment, is, I think, a legitimate aim of public policy”.359 WWF 
supported this:
“The work that farmers, land managers and landowners do to sustain 
and restore our natural environment should be valued and rewarded. 
Taxpayers’ money should only be invested in producing public benefits 
such as clean water, a wide array of wildlife everywhere and beautiful 
places for people to enjoy.”360
224. On behalf of the farming sector, Mr Aston told us: “As farmers we take great 
pride in producing the environmental landscape and protecting it generally.”361 
Guy Smith, Vice President of the NFU, stated: “We fully accept that the 
concept of paying farmers to deliver environmental goods or landscape, 
hitches and ditches, the traditional British countryside that is so loved by 
British people, is maybe an easier political ask than some blunt support 
payment.” But he added: “You would not want it to be too bureaucratic or 
complicated … There is an opportunity to have simpler schemes.”362
225. Wyn Grant, Emeritus Professor of Politics at the University of Warwick, 
focused on ecosystem services, describing them as “a complex range of 
services … such as preventing flooding downstream, afforestation, protecting 
peat land, and so on”.363 Ian Hodge, Professor of Rural Economy at the 
University of Cambridge, argued that “we do not really need an agricultural 
policy; we need an ecosystem services policy. We need to set out thinking 
that our aim should be to deliver the maximum social value from rural 
land rather than to recreate an agricultural policy”.364 The Wildfowl and 
Wetlands Trust agreed: “The UK’s farmed landscape provides ecosystem 
services worth billions of pounds.”365
Other public goods
226. Environmental protection is not the only outcome that could be rewarded 
with financial support. Mr Aston stated: “It is all about … trying to go back 
to where we started being rewarded for producing food. We would love to 
get a proper reward from the supply chain but it does not happen.”366 The 
Campaign to Protect Rural England (CPRE) reminded us that “the public 
benefits farming provides are broader than environmental ones; other 
benefits include rural social capital, access to the countryside and public 
understanding of food production”,367 and the RSPB suggested that “there 
should also be a programme of support to enable farmers to innovate”.368
359  Q 84
360  Written evidence from WWF (ABR0010)
361  Q 46
362  Q 46
363  Q 9
364  Q 59
365  Written evidence from Wildfowl and Wetlands Trust (ABR0022)
366  Q 46; also Q 46 (Guy Smith) and written evidence from Sustain (ABR0003)
367  Written evidence from CPRE (ABR0047)
368  Written evidence from RSPB (ABR0009)
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227. In addition to support for public goods, the Minister supported exploring 
other options:
“There are two other areas that we have talked about as possible options 
for farm support. One would be doing a lot more by way of productivity, 
knowledge transfer, investment in science, good value for money by 
investment in technology and maybe grant aid to help farmers invest in 
the next generation of technology. Then, finally, there is animal health 
and welfare.”369
International constraints
228. As discussed above, WTO rules place constraints on the design of domestic 
agricultural support schemes (see Box 2). The Minister, for instance, 
acknowledged that while agri-environment schemes that meet the Green Box 
criteria are permissible under WTO rules, some of the schemes he described 
might require a portion of the EU’s Amber Box allowance to allow the 
UK to design a bespoke agricultural support scheme after Brexit.370 Given 
the uncertainty over the UK’s ability to secure a share of that allowance, 
Michael Cardwell, Professor of Agricultural Law at the University of Leeds, 
suggested that “Perhaps the greatest scope to secure WTO compatibility 
may therefore be provided by … the Green Box exemption under Annex 2 to 
the [Agreement on Agriculture]”.371
229. Prof Cardwell noted that, by using the Green Box exemption, the UK 
Government would be able to develop a financial support scheme focused on 
food quality, the development of robotics or drone technology, and possibly 
food security, in addition to supporting environmental public goods.372 
However, both he and the FUW noted the limitation prescribed in Annex 2, 
which “states that ‘The amount of [agri-environment] payment shall be 
limited to the extra costs or loss of income involved in complying with the 
government programme’”.373
230. Prof Cardwell also cast doubt on the RSPCA’s argument that “The UK 
can make its subsidies for farmers trade compatible by de-linking them 
from production and focusing them on animal welfare outcomes e.g. by 
rewarding farmers for higher welfare systems”.374 He noted that “Annex 2 
does not include Green Box payments to compensate farmers for adopting 
higher standards of animal welfare, although the possibility of introducing 
such payments has been raised by the EU during the course of the Doha 
Development Round”.375
231. Mr Lancaster pointed out that “Where you have examples where the farming 
is inherently uneconomic and you want to maintain that agricultural activity 
to secure the goods and services we have been talking about, the scope exists 
… to pay the total costs of production”.376 Alan Matthews, Professor Emeritus 
of Agricultural Economics at Trinity College Dublin, stated: “There is room 
369  Q 83
370  Q 84 (George Eustice MP)
371  Written evidence from Prof Michael Cardwell (ABR0049)
372  Written evidence from Prof Michael Cardwell (ABR0049)
373  Written evidence from Farmers’ Union of Wales (ABR0045) and Prof Michael Cardwell (ABR0049)
374  Written evidence from RSPCA (ABR0006)
375  Written evidence from Prof Michael Cardwell (ABR0049). The Doha Development Round was a 
round of trade negotiations among the WTO membership. It was launched in 2001.
376  Q 68
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for creative interpretation and that if the Government were designing a more 
results-based scheme it probably would not be challenged within the WTO 
provided that it was a legitimate agri-environment scheme.”377 We were also 
told there was currently unused flexibility within the WTO rules. Professor 
Joseph McMahon, Dean of the Sunderland School of Law at University 
College Dublin, told us: “There is one provision in Annex 2 that has not yet 
been used by any WTO member, and that is Paragraph 5, which allows you 
to design your own Green Box policy provided that certain conditions are 
met.”378
232. The Minister stated that the Green Box exemption could not be used for all 
support measures being considered by the Government:
“Ironically, the single farm payment, which is ultimately an area-
based, distorting subsidy, technically at the moment qualifies as Green 
Box, whereas the types of policies that would be more modern, more 
progressive—payments to get animal welfare outcomes, risk management 
measures, those types of things—we understand, at the moment, would 
probably be deemed under the WTO rules as Amber Box. There is this 
sort of inversion that a modern, progressive policy probably requires, in 
the short term, some sort of Amber Box.”379
233. Even without a share of the EU’s Amber Box allowance, the UK would 
not be entirely prohibited from providing trade-distorting support to the 
agricultural sector. Under the de minimis provisions (see Box 2) the UK 
could potentially provide support without being challenged by other WTO 
members. However, witnesses disagreed on whether this approach would 
allow the UK to maintain its current level of support.380
Competitiveness and CAP alignment
234. The First Minister of Wales was concerned about the risk of competitive 
disadvantage once CAP funding ceased: “The loss of EU subsidy for our 
farmers—if no replacement funding is available—will put our producers at 
a competitive disadvantage compared with those neighbouring countries 
remaining in the EU.”381 Mr Smith was “wary of having to trade or compete 
with farmers who get greater levels of support than we do”,382 while Dairy 
UK argued: “The UK dairy sector will have to compete with subsidised EU 
farmers. Therefore, it will be important for UK dairy farmers to have a level 
playing field with their EU counterparts, by maintaining similar levels of 
financial support.”383
235. The CAP is reformed in seven-year cycles, and the next period will be 
2021–2027. Preparations are already underway for this cycle, and formal 
negotiations are likely to start in 2018/19.384 The NFU told us: “We obviously 
need to observe this process and be as closely involved as possible to ensure 
377  Q 35
378  Q 35; also written evidence from Prof Michael Cardwell (ABR0049)
379  Q 84
380  Q 33 (Prof Alan Matthews) and written evidence from Prof Michael Cardwell (ABR0049)
381  Written evidence from Welsh Government (ABR0050)
382  Q 43
383  Written evidence from Dairy UK (ABR0035)
384  House of Commons Library, EU Referendum: impact on UK Agriculture Policy, Briefing paper 7602, 
May 2016, p 13
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we do not end up with something so different it either obstructs trade or puts 
us at a competitive disadvantage.”385
236. The Minister, in contrast, believed that “the notion of a level playing field 
is elusive. My view is that it is probably not the right thing to target.”386 He 
argued that instead “we should be targeting good, coherent policy that 
delivers for agriculture so that our farmers can get a competitive advantage 
in the world because we have good policies that support them to become 
profitable, competitive, productive and sustainable”.387
Conclusions and recommendations
237. Many farmers rely on Pillar I and II funding to keep their businesses 
viable, and any substantial reductions in the level of support would 
have a significant impact on both the agriculture sector and the 
wider rural economy. The Government should clarify its intentions 
regarding financial support post-2020 as soon as possible to provide 
the certainty required to make investment decisions.
238. Brexit provides an opportunity for the Government to evaluate not 
only the level, but the objectives and structure of financial support to 
farmers, and to design simpler support schemes which are effective 
in the context of UK agriculture. We note that this could include 
support for the rural economy or those in less favoured areas (such as 
hill farmers), for investment in technology to improve productivity, 
for environmental protection, or to ensure UK farmers are not at 
a competitive disadvantage compared to their EU counterparts. 
We encourage the Government carefully to review the needs of the 
agricultural sectors across the UK, and to consult with the industry, 
to ensure that any future support is targeted and effective.
239. There is a case for continuing to provide financial support to farmers 
after 2020 to correct market failures and deliver public goods, such 
as environmental protection and ecosystems services, which would 
not otherwise be paid for. We welcome the Minister’s support for this 
position.
240. Nevertheless, we recognise that agriculture will be competing with 
many other sectors for public expenditure. The agricultural sector 
will have to make a strong case to maintain financial support at the 
same or similar levels to that provided under the CAP.
241. WTO rules may hinder the design of support schemes tailored to 
UK objectives. The Government should factor these constraints 
into its post-Brexit agriculture policy, and negotiate a share of the 
EU’s Amber Box allowance to maximise its options for designing 
an effective post-CAP support scheme. It should also consider how 
to support the provision of public goods through agriculture in the 
event it does not secure such a share.
385  Supplementary written evidence from NFU (ABR0042)
386  Q 83
387  Q 83
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Funding and devolution
242. Notwithstanding the relative importance of funding for farmers in all 
less favoured areas of the UK, we heard that farmers in the devolved 
nations are proportionally more reliant on CAP funding. NFU Cymru 
informed us that “Around 80% of Welsh farmers’ incomes comes from the 
Common Agricultural Policy”,388 while Fergus Ewing MSP, of the Scottish 
Government, told us that “CAP funds and support payments account for 
around two-thirds of total income from farming in Scotland … Income 
support is therefore crucial, especially for fragile farming businesses in 
remote and constrained areas.”389 DAERA noted that such support was still 
more critical in Northern Ireland: “Without direct support, the aggregate 
income of the NI farming sector would have been negative in 4 out of last 7 
years.”390
243. The FUW reminded us, “Under the current Common Agricultural Policy, 
agricultural and Rural Development spending in devolved regions is 
effectively ring-fenced outside the Barnett Formula.”391 Dr Greer noted that 
it was “unclear” how funding would be disbursed after 2020, “whether via 
the Barnett Formula or through some other arrangement involving ‘topping-
up’”.392 Scott Walker, CEO of NFU Scotland, argued that the Barnett 
formula would be “inadequate to address this repatriation of powers”, and he 
would “be looking at … the Scottish Government, with the UK Government, 
agreeing a fair and reasonable budgetary settlement”.393
244. NFU Cymru calculated that “If EU funds lost to Wales upon Brexit were 
replaced by the UK Treasury according to a population based Barnett 
calculation, then compared to the current mechanism for dividing up EU 
funds among the home nations, it is likely that Wales would be looking at 
an allocation reduction of 40%”.394 Mr Ewing believed that “moving to a 
population share of this essential support could result in Scotland losing 
around half the current CAP allocation.”395
Funding and the UK’s internal market
245. Dr Viviane Gravey, Dr Brian Jack and Dr Lee McGowan from Queen’s 
University Belfast noted that “While England and Wales appear to favour 
narrow environmental goals in their use of rural development funds 
(principally through agri-environment-climate schemes); Scotland and 
Northern Ireland favour a more ‘multifunctional’ approach … encompassing 
social and cultural aspects as well”.396 Such differences could increase once 
the CAP ceases to apply, and NFU Cymru therefore argued: “In order 
to avoid distorting the UK’s internal market, NFU Cymru would like the 
governments of the UK home nations agreeing by mutual consent a common 
388  Written evidence from NFU Cymru (ABR0034)
389  Written evidence from Scottish Government (ABR0052)
390  Written evidence from DAERA - Northern Ireland (ABR0048)
391  Written evidence from Farmers’ Union of Wales (ABR0045). Under the Barnett Formula, the 
Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive receive a population-
based proportion of changes in planned UK government spending on comparable services in England, 
England and Wales or Great Britain as appropriate.
392  Written evidence from Dr Alan Greer (ABR0014)
393  Oral evidence taken before the European Union Select Committee, 1 February 2017 (Session 2016–
17), Q 51 (Scott Walker)
394  Written evidence from NFU Cymru (ABR0034)
395  Written evidence from Scottish Government (ABR0052)
396  Written evidence from Dr Viviane Gravey, Dr Brian Jack and Dr Lee McGowan (ABR0021)
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overarching agricultural framework that will determine the level of support 
available in each of the home nations.”397
Conclusions and recommendations
246. Farmers in the devolved nations are proportionally heavily dependent 
on the financial support provided by the CAP. Funding mechanisms 
post-Brexit, while ensuring that farmers across the UK continue to 
receive the support necessary to keep their industry productive and 
sustainable, will need to avoid distorting the UK’s internal agri-food 
market.
Funding transition
247. Prof Grant emphasised that, in agricultural funding as in other areas, “we 
need to have a transitional arrangement to ensure that farm businesses are 
not faced with a cliff edge.”398 Mr Breitmeyer noted that “the current funding 
has basically been the equivalent of the total income from farming for the 
last 20 years, and if we take a significant proportion of that away, we face 
significant structural change very early on. Transition is a very important 
part of it”.399 Allan Wilkinson, Head of Agrifoods at HSBC Bank plc, agreed: 
“I think most businesses would be ready and prepared to make that change 
if they had the clarity and direction and if they could see what a food and 
farming strategy would look like … There is no doubt about it, if we had a 
shock some businesses would really struggle to cope with that change.”400
248. It will be important for any transition period to reflect the working realities 
of the agricultural sector. According to Mr Walker, “If you look at the more 
traditional sector in Scotland, which is livestock-production, you are talking 
about, on average, a minimum of at least a three-year lifecycle for people to 
decide breeding patterns and for product to come to the end.”401 Prof Hodge 
suggested that “if farmers anticipate a reduction in direct payments, they 
can see that happening over a five-year or perhaps even 10-year period so 
they can plan for it”.402 Alan Swinbank, Emeritus Professor of Agricultural 
Economics at the University of Reading, suggested “a five, 10, 15-year period 
… That gives farmers some time to adjust”.403
249. DAERA suggested that “any change in support mechanisms or levels of 
support would require a period of transition—the more radical the change, 
the longer the necessary transition period”.404 The Minister told us: “You 
mentioned the point about transition. I think that depends on how different 
where we want to end up is from where we are now, and the length of that 
transition will depend on that.”405
397  Written evidence from NFU Cymru (ABR0034)
398  Q 6; also written evidence from the National Sheep Association (ABR0025) and Scottish Land & 
Estates (ABR0032)
399  Q 14
400  Q 8
401  Oral evidence taken before the European Union Select Committee, 1 February 2017 (Session 2016–
17), Q 47 (Scott Walker)
402  Q 66
403  Q 8
404  Written evidence from DAERA - Northern Ireland (ABR0048)
405  Q 81
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250. As noted above, the Chancellor of the Exchequer has guaranteed CAP 
funding that was agreed before the 2016 Autumn Statement until 2020.406 In 
relation to the period 2019–20, the Minister told us: “I think there may be 
an option in the final year for us to leave behind some of the frustrating EU 
auditing requirements and pointless record-keeping … but the design of the 
scheme, essentially, will be the same.”407
Conclusions and recommendations
251. Farmers will need a transitional period in order to adjust to any new 
financial support scheme, and to provide the certainty they need 
to invest and adjust their business practices. The duration of the 
transitional period should be based on consultation with the industry 
and reflect the magnitude of change being implemented.
406  HM Government, Chancellor Philip Hammond guarantees EU funding beyond date UK leaves the EU 
(August 2016): https://www.gov.uk/government/news/chancellor–philip–hammond–guarantees–eu–
funding–beyond–date–uk–leaves–the–eu [accessed 4 April 2017]. The Government guaranteed that 
the current level of agricultural funding under CAP Pillar 1 will be upheld until 2020 and any agri-
environment schemes agreed before the Autumn Statement will be fully funded—even when these 
projects continue beyond the UK’s departure from the EU.
407  Q 82
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ChAPTER 6: ACCESS TO LABOUR
Scale and scope of EU labour
252. EU nationals can exercise their free movement rights in two respects: first, 
as EU citizens, and secondly, as workers. Under Articles 45–48 TFEU, EU 
workers have the right to work in any Member State; to travel to any Member 
State to seek employment; to live in any Member State; and to claim some 
benefits after being employed. These rights are explained in more detail in 
our report on Brexit: UK-EU movement of people.408
Agricultural sectors affected
253. Freedom of movement has enabled EU nationals from other Member States 
to take up seasonal as well as permanent jobs throughout the agri-food supply 
chain and across the UK. The exact proportion of EU labour is unknown, 
but it is clear that EU migrants make up a substantial proportion of the 
workforce across all agricultural sectors in the UK. Dr Viviane Gravey, Dr 
Brian Jack and Dr Lee McGowan from Queen’s University Belfast told us: 
“Of the 80,000-seasonal workforce in horticulture alone, 98% are migrants 
from elsewhere in the EU.”409 According to Dairy UK, “On average non UK 
born [labour] accounts for around 11% of the processing workforce” in the 
UK dairy industry,410 while the British Egg Industry Council told us that 
approximately 40% of staff on egg farms and approximately 50% of staff 
in egg packing centres were EU migrants.411 We heard from the National 
Pig Association that “one in five farms and businesses connected to the pig 
industry would struggle to survive without migrant labour”,412 and from 
the British Poultry Council that “Of the 35,900 direct employees [in the 
British poultry meat industry] around 60% (21,540) are migrant workers”.413 
According to the BMPA “around 63%” of the workforce of the British red 
and white meat processing industry are “from the EU27 countries (mainly, 
but not exclusively, central and eastern Europe)”.414
254. A loss of EU labour in one part of the agri-food supply chain could have an 
impact on the rest. Guy Smith, Vice President of the NFU, commented that 
“I am here to represent farmers but I am very conscious that the rest of the 
food chain, including abattoirs and vets, is very dependent on migrant labour, 
so indirectly our industry would be damaged if we did not have access to that 
skill set”.415 Similarly, the Agricultural Industries Confederation (AIC) told 
us: “Whilst labour is less of a direct issue for AIC members … we are very 
conscious of the indirect impact on the whole industry if there is an inability 
for growers and others (e.g. food manufacturers) to access sufficient short 
term and casual labour.”416
255. One consequence of a persistent shortage in labour supply could be higher 
costs for the consumers. The British Poultry Council told us: “Labour is a 
408  European Union Committee, Brexit: UK-EU movement of people (14th Report, Session 2016–17, HL 
Paper 121) 
409  Q 45; also supplementary written evidence from Soil Association (ABR0033) and written evidence 
from Dr Viviane Gravey, Dr Brian Jack and Dr Lee McGowan (ABR0021) 
410  Written evidence from Dr Viviane Gravey, Dr Brian Jack and Dr Lee McGowan (ABR0021)
411  Written evidence from British Egg Industry Council (ABR0017)
412  Written evidence from National Pig Association (ABR0005)
413  Written evidence from British Poultry Council (ABR0027)
414  Written evidence from British Meat Processors Association (ABR0041)
415  Q 45
416  Written evidence from Agricultural Industries Confederation (ABR0018)
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significant portion of the cost of production. With more roles to fill, fewer 
people interested (UK and migrant), and competition from other sectors 
and countries we will see the cost of production increase.”417 Similarly, the 
Food Foundation noted: “Decreased labour availability/increased costs 
could likewise raise consumer prices of horticultural produce.”418
Nature of EU labour
256. We heard from the British Growers Association that seasonal labour was vital 
to the UK horticultural sector: “Currently the sector relies on around 90% 
of its total seasonal labour requirement (75,000–80,000) coming from the 
EU.”419 This was echoed by Allan Wilkinson, Head of Agrifoods at HSBC 
Bank plc: “There is very heavy dependence on seasonal labour to harvest key 
sensitive high-value crops such as hops and soft fruit and certain fruit and 
vegetables.”420 Wyn Grant, Emeritus Professor of Politics at the University 
of Warwick, concluded that the “horticultural sector and the field vegetable 
sector … could not function without the seasonal labour that comes to it”.421
257. George Dunn, Chief Executive of the TFA, emphasised that “it is not just 
seasonal labour that we need; we also need permanent labour for full time 
jobs”.422 The BMPA pointed out that “The meat processing sector is not 
particularly seasonal, so these [EU] staff are in the workforce all year round”,423 
while the British Poultry Council informed us that, in their sector, “21,540 
migrant workers are in long-term (in employment terms: permanent) roles”.424
258. Witnesses noted that EU labour accounts for significant proportions of some 
specialised agricultural roles, most notably in the veterinary profession. 
Fergus Ewing MSP, of the Scottish Government, told us that “a significant 
proportion of the veterinary profession working in Scotland are EU-
nationals, particularly in food hygiene and state veterinary medicine”.425 The 
First Minister of Wales described a similar picture.426
259. In determining the impact of Brexit on the access to labour in agri-food, 
no easy distinction can be made between skilled and unskilled labour.427 
Mr Smith told us: “I am very wary of describing these people as unskilled; 
they are extremely diligent and clever at what they do.”428 Despite this level of 
work specific skill, he told us that: “I suppose in terms of visa requirements 
it will always be unskilled because you do not tend to get degrees in picking 
vegetables.” The BMPA accordingly argued: “We would like to see the 
definition of ‘skilled’ to mean an ability that has to be learnt through study 
and/or practice, something that someone could not walk in off the street and 
immediately do to the necessary level.”429 NFU Scotland similarly cautioned 
that “a points-based system led by skills will be of little use to the agricultural 
417  Written evidence from British Poultry Council (ABR0027)
418  Written evidence from The Food Foundation (ABR0030)
419  Written evidence from British Growers Association (ABR0036)
420  Q 2
421  Q 2
422  Q 19
423  Written evidence from British Meat Processors Association (ABR0041)
424  Written evidence from British Poultry Council (ABR0027)
425  Written evidence from Scottish Government (ABR0052)
426  Written evidence from Welsh Government (ABR0050)
427  We considered in detail the issue of low-skill versus high-skill labour in our report Brexit: UK-EU 
movement of people (14th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 121), Chapter 4.
428  Q 45; also Q 17 (George Dunn)
429  Written evidence from British Meat Processors Association (ABR0041)
70 BRExIT: AGRICULTURE
food processing industry in particular. For example, having skill with knives 
is essential in abattoirs however this may not be considered on the same level 
as veterinary training in a visa process.”430
260. Peter Hardwick, Head of Exports at the AHDB, suggested: “When you talk 
about skilled or non-skilled labour, it might be better to redefine that as 
‘hard-to-fill vacancies’.”431 He gave the example of working in an abattoir: 
“The work is quite hard or not entirely pleasant … those jobs may be quite 
low-skilled, but they are extremely hard to fill from local sources.” Mr Dunn 
agreed: “We need to have a system that says, ‘What is the need? Is there 
a supply?’ If not, we need to have a system that allows that supply to be 
brought in.”432
261. The Minister acknowledged many of these concerns: “We should not lose 
sight of the fact that in many areas it is where you have what people would 
deem unskilled labour that you have the gap, so it is not about saying that 
we are going to have these skilled people and we do not want the unskilled.”433
Reasons for local labour shortage
262. The heavy reliance upon migrant labour reflects in part a shortage of domestic 
labour. Witnesses suggested a number of reasons for this. Prof Grant told 
us that “it is no good going into the local unemployment pool because the 
labour from there is not reliable, it does not turn up and does not work 
very efficiently”.434 Ian Wright, Director General of the FDF, suggested that 
in areas of the country with “super-full employment”, UK workers were 
unwilling to undertake the journeys or tolerate the conditions involved.435 The 
BMPA noted that meat processing work “does not have high social cachet—
for reasons of food safety the sites are kept cold, workers wear a significant 
amount of food and personal safety equipment, the work is physical and it 
is shift work. So when there is availability in the local workforce we tend to 
lose out to other industries”.436 More broadly, Mr Ewing pointed out that 
“rural populations are ageing and in certain areas declining. Demographic 
change and the rural workforce are two of the reasons why Scotland needs 
movement of people”.437
Timing
263. The shortfall in EU labour is already a problem, as Mr Breitmeyer told us: 
“We do right here and now face a shortage, even in 2017.”438 The Food Ethics 
Council warned that “parts of the sector are already finding it difficult to 
recruit and retain enough staff”,439 while Mr Smith told us that “some of my 
horticulturalists are saying they are struggling to recruit at levels they have 
in the past”.440 Mr Dunn raised the same concerns:
430  Written evidence from NFU Scotland (ABR0007)
431  Q 53
432  Q 17
433  Q 88
434  Q 2; also Q 17 (Tim Breitmeyer)
435  Q 53
436  Written evidence from British Meat Processors Association (ABR0041); also NFU Cymru (ABR0034)
437  Written evidence from Scottish Government (ABR0052)
438  Q 1
439  Written evidence from Food Ethics Council (ABR0020)
440  Q 45; also written evidence from British Meat Processors Association (ABR0041)
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“Already with the reduction in the exchange rate we are seeing some EU 
nationals making the decision to return to their home countries, because 
they have seen a 20% reduction in their salaries … There are certain 
parts of the country where we are seeing pretty repugnant xenophobia, 
which is also encouraging people not to feel welcome and return home. 
We have a problem now with labour.”441
In the food and drinks industry, Mr Wright also noted that “we are seeing 
those [EU] workers beginning to think about going home”.442 He added: 
“For us, an urgent challenge is for the Government to come forward with a 
pledge that European workers can stay here”.
Conclusions and recommendations
264. Many workers in the agricultural sector are often regarded as 
‘unskilled’, but are in fact extremely skilled at sector-specific tasks 
such as crop handling and harvesting. We recommend that the 
Government recognise these skills when assessing labour needs and 
access to foreign labour after Brexit. We also welcome the Minister’s 
recognition that continued access to EU labour should be based on 
an assessment of the needs of the industry, rather than a simplistic 
distinction between skilled and unskilled labour.
265. UK agriculture and food sectors are highly dependent on access to 
not only seasonal, but also permanent, skilled and unskilled (in terms 
of education level) workers from the rest of the EU. The entire food 
supply chain will be adversely affected by any loss of access to that 
labour pool.
266. We particularly bring to the Government’s attention the overwhelming 
reliance of the sector on EU citizens providing veterinary services 
in abattoirs, which are essential to ensure compliance with food 
standards and regulations.
267. The evidence we heard suggests the agricultural sector is already 
struggling to fill vacant positions and that this challenge is being 
exacerbated by the uncertainty surrounding the UK’s withdrawal 
from the EU. We therefore urge the Government to work with farmers 
and the food processing industry and to assist their recruitment 
efforts.
268. In our report on Brexit: acquired rights we concluded that the longer 
the future of EU nationals in the UK is uncertain, “the less attractive 
a place to live and work the UK will be, and the greater labour market 
gaps will be”. This risk is already materialising in the agri-food 
sector, and we therefore repeat our call for the Government to clarify 
the rights of these EU nationals to remain and work in the UK.
441  Q 17
442  Q 51
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Filling the labour gap
Recruitment
269. Taking the steps necessary to meet the recruitment needs of the agricultural 
sector will take time. As Mr Smith said, “You cannot do it at the drop of 
a hat, by putting a note up in the pub and people turning up the following 
day, as they did in my dad’s time. There is an element of preparation.”443 He 
continued: “Talking to some other horticulturalists, they say they are now 
trying to recruit through British universities more than they did in the past 
to make up for what may be that gap.”
270. But as Mr Dunn noted, “We cannot turn off the tap of that EU labour that 
we have been used to … We absolutely need to look at the visa system to 
ensure that we have the right access for a transitional period while we build 
capacity at home.”444 To that end, Mr Smith expressed interest “in a return 
to what was called the old Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS) 
where people came in to this country to work at one establishment, one 
business, and then went back to their homes having served that contract”.445 
NFU Cymru noted that “the prospect of sourcing labour from beyond the 
EU also has to be considered”.446
271. The Minister told us: “It is quite possible, if we decide that there is a need 
in agriculture or, indeed, even in food processing, to grant the right type of 
work permit that would enable the numbers of people we need to be able 
to come here and work for the duration that we need them to.”447 Robert 
Goodwill MP, Minister of State for Immigration, has also told the EU Home 
Affairs Sub-Committee that “Brexit gives us the opportunity to have an off-
the-peg immigration policy that addresses many of the concerns those in 
… agriculture have expressed”,448 and that a seasonal agricultural workers 
scheme was “one model that might be worthy of consideration”.449 Mr Eustice 
noted that the reinstatement of a SAWS was “very much a discussion that is 
taking place between the Home Office and industry”.450 In supplementary 
evidence he added: “In terms of EU nationals, we are considering carefully 
options for the new immigration system once the UK exits the EU, and 
specifically EU nationals’ access to the UK’s labour market.”451
272. In our report Brexit: UK-EU movement of people, we noted that an apparently 
restrictive work permit system with exemptions for particular sectors, 
such as a SAWS, “could produce the worst of all worlds, failing to deliver 
a meaningful reduction in immigration while also proving more onerous 
and costly for employers, prospective applicants, and those charged with 
enforcement”.452 We also note that on 15 March 2017, Mr Goodwill told 
443  Q 45
444  Q 18
445  Q 45 (Guy Smith); also Q 2 (Prof Wyn Grant) and Q 19 (Tim Breitmeyer)
446  Written evidence from NFU Cymru (ABR0034)
447  Q 88
448  Oral evidence taken before EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee, 11 January 2017 (Session 2016–17), 
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449  Oral evidence taken before EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee, 11 January 2017 (Session 2016–17), 
Q 75 
450  Q 88
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452  European Union Committee, Brexit: UK-EU movement of people (14th Report, Session 2016–17, HL 
Paper 121), para 167 
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the House of Commons EFRA Committee that “We do not believe there 
is sufficient evidence to justify a seasonal agricultural workers’ scheme in 
2017”.453
Technological solutions
273. Mr Wilkinson addressed the possibility of addressing labour shortages by 
means of technology: “When we come to look at the substitution of one 
resource for another … some technology is available, mainly robots and the 
like, but it is about making sure the industry or the enterprise concerned 
feels confident enough to make the investment, which might take two or 
three years—in some cases 10 years—to repay.”454 The Food Ethics Council 
echoed this point: “A fall in migrant labour will be an impetus for further 
technological advances … The issue here, though is whether—with the 
current uncertainty over the terms of Brexit—companies will have the 
confidence to invest in large scale mechanisation.”455
274. There are also limits to automation, as Mr Smith told us: “At the moment 
there is no such thing as a robot that can pick a strawberry; it does not exist 
other than in a lab somewhere.”456 Mr Breitmeyer commented: “The problem 
is the quality that they need to put into the supermarkets. Innovation has not 
yet produced the equipment to ensure that quality. It can do the job, but it 
will not ensure the sufficient quality.”457 The BMPA agreed: “Some tasks 
are simply still beyond the wit of a machine—wrapping small, wet cocktail 
sausages in bacon to make pigs in blankets is an obvious one.”458 They added: 
“The slaughter line is not prone to automation because the machines are not 
dextrous enough to adapt quickly and efficiently to the different shapes and 
sizes of the animals.”
Conclusions and recommendations
275. In the short term, technology cannot materially reduce the UK’s 
need for EU agricultural labour; nor is there sufficient local labour 
to address the shortfall. Unless arrangements are made to preserve 
access to labour from outside the UK, the agri-food industry will 
suffer major disruption.
276. The UK agri-food supply chain employs both seasonal and permanent 
EU workers, so a seasonal agricultural workers scheme alone, though 
a priority for our witnesses, will not be a sufficient measure for 
preserving access to labour.
453  Oral evidence taken before Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, 15 March 2017 (Session 
2016–17), Q 215 
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ChAPTER 7: RESOURCES
Pressure on Defra
277. Defra has seen its budget reduced by 29.9% in real terms from 2010/11 to 
2015/16.459 Mr Smith reflected on the fact that Defra had been “first in 
the line suffering government cuts”, and expressed concern that “they do 
not have the necessary resources and skillsets in place to take us forward to 
make sure that our industry has a smooth transition”.460 Mr Wright agreed: 
“The replacement of the Common Agricultural Policy is a job that would tax 
Stephen Hawking on speed. The fact that Defra has to do that in two years 
is a huge undertaking and it is not surprising that that is taking up a great 
deal of its time.”461
278. Witnesses identified several roles Defra would be required to take on to 
support the agricultural sector post-Brexit:
• Sponsoring body. Mr Smith told us: “For too long Defra has seen 
itself as a regulatory body because support comes from Brussels. It 
must now see itself as a sponsoring body that looks after the interests of 
British agriculture. That is going to need a culture shift”.462
• Trade negotiator. The Food Research Collaboration noted “the 
urgent need for improved trade negotiation capacities in Defra and 
other UK ministries which might affect security of food supplies.”463
• Co-ordinator across the UK. The First Minister of Wales pointed 
out that “it is vital for the UK Government to work with the devolved 
administrations in order to identify the most effective approach for the 
UK as a whole”, and noted that the structures for such co-ordination 
were “currently provided by European institutions”.464
279. In addition, the Food Ethics Council highlighted the importance of ‘business 
as usual’: “There are many long-term issues and initiatives that the UK 
Government must retain (and build) focus on, rather than be ‘distracted’ by 
Brexit alone.” These included reducing food waste and improving food and 
nutrition security for the UK.465
280. The Minister responded: “There are discussions across government and the 
Cabinet Office looking at where we may need additional people and where 
we can pull people from … we are doing a lot of work to pull policy expertise 
back from the agencies.”466 Pamela Thompson, Head of the EU Exit Team 
for Animal and Plant Health at Defra, noted: “It is not just about the bodies 
doing this; it is about the people who have a depth of knowledge who can go 
into the detail of the law … I feel confident now, six months in, that I have 
the right team behind me to be able to do it. It will remain a priority for the 
next two years because we have to get it right.”467
459  House of Commons Library, EU Referendum: Impact on UK Agriculture Policy, Briefing Paper 
7602, May 2016, p 14 
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Institutional capacity
281. As Which? noted, agencies and regulators, as well as central Government, 
will face increased demands: “Overseeing and checking compliance, along 
with the customs checks that will need to be introduced, will take a lot more 
resources and require additional capacity and expertise within the Food 
Standards Agency and Food Standards Scotland.”468 With reference to trade 
in meat, Prof Matthews stated:
“The UK would have every right to check on the health and disease 
status of these herds. There would be an operational issue in that much 
of this checking and so on is now done through EU institutions, so 
you would have to build up that capacity here. You would be sending 
inspectors to those—let us take Brazil as the example—Brazilian meat 
plants to ensure that the standards there met the standards that you 
required for import.”469
282. The Minister noted:
“We have already the [Animal and Plant Health Agency] … who deal 
with all the export certification work. The bit that would be additional 
is doing something that the FVO, the EU’s veterinary office, currently 
deals with—the inward inspections of plants in China or whatever 
country you are seeking to import from. That would be new, additional 
work and we would need additional people to be able to do that work, 
but the expertise to draw on to do that work is already there.”470
283. As we noted in Chapter 4, Defra currently works with many EU bodies and 
agencies.471 If the Government wants this work to continue, and if the UK is 
not able to continue to draw on EU resources post-Brexit, those bodies will 
need to be replicated in the UK, with corresponding resource implications.
Conclusions and recommendations
284. UK bodies, such as the food inspection agencies, will need additional 
resources if they are to take on roles currently fulfilled by EU 
institutions in relation to the agri-food sector. One of these new roles 
will be an inspection workforce working in countries with which we 
have FTAs to ensure the upholding of welfare and phytosanitary 
standards.
285. Defra faces an enormous challenge in repatriating agricultural policy 
alongside fisheries and environmental policy, particularly given the 
heavy cuts in its budget over recent years. Its role in relation to the 
agriculture sector will also increase significantly. The Department 
will need significant numbers of additional staff, with appropriate 
expertise. We welcome Defra’s use of expertise from its agencies as 
an interim measure to inform policy development ahead of Brexit, 
but the Department will need to secure sufficient long-term resource.
468  Written evidence from Which? (ABR0013)
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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Withdrawing from the Common Agricultural Policy
1. Leaving the Common Agricultural Policy and the European Union will 
have fundamental implications for the agricultural sector in the UK. In the 
long term the UK has an opportunity to review and improve its agriculture, 
environment, and food policy, better meeting the needs of the agriculture 
sector, the environment and consumers. But in the short term, the 
Government will need to work closely with the industry to help it respond to 
critical challenges: forging new trading arrangements with the EU and the 
rest of the world; providing regulatory stability and clarity; addressing the 
future of funding for the agricultural sector; and ensuring access to labour. 
(Paragraph 21)
Future trade in agri-food products
The UK’s new WTO schedules of concessions
2. In our report Brexit: trade in goods we concluded: “When establishing its 
own schedules at the WTO, the UK Government must give particular 
consideration to the implications of tariffs on the UK agricultural sector. 
High tariffs on imports would raise the cost to UK consumers, whereas lower 
tariffs could reduce the cost of food to consumers, but might undermine the 
domestic agricultural sector’s competitiveness.” We endorse this conclusion 
and underline its importance. (Paragraph 67)
3. Reaching agreement on dividing the EU’s Tariff Rate Quotas for agricultural 
products could be challenging, not least because the proposed reallocation 
will be open to negotiation by WTO members, not only the EU. We urge the 
Government to analyse the current patterns of trade under existing TRQs 
and the implications of a proposed split on the agricultural sectors and food 
manufacturers that benefit from the current TRQs in preparation for these 
negotiations. (Paragraph 68)
4. There is no precedent for splitting the Aggregate Measurement of Support—
or the Amber Box entitlement—and in our view the Minister was over-
confident that other WTO members would accept such a split. We invite the 
Government to confirm that it is considering alternatives, should the split be 
contested. (Paragraph 69)
Negotiating a UK-EU trade agreement
5. The UK is a net importer of food and therefore a very attractive market for 
agri-food products both from the EU and globally. We expect this to give the 
UK a strong position during trade negotiations for those products both with 
the EU and, after Brexit, with third countries. (Paragraph 107)
6. Nevertheless, leaving the Single Market and the Customs Union will create 
significant uncertainty for the UK agri-food sector. The EU is the single 
largest market for UK agriculture and food products, and our witnesses 
were clear that preserving tariff and non-tariff barrier free trade with 
the EU should be a priority. If the UK leaves the EU without agreeing a 
comprehensive UK-EU FTA, or a form of transitional arrangement, UK-
EU trade would have to proceed according to WTO rules. Many of our 
agricultural producers, and our food manufacturers, would incur substantial 
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costs associated with tariff and non-tariff barriers when exporting to the EU, 
with sectors such as pig and sheep meat at particular risk. (Paragraph 108)
7. Moreover, the agricultural and food manufacturing sectors are integrated 
into EU-wide supply chains. It is imperative that a UK-EU trade deal should 
avoid the imposition of tariffs on trade in both directions, to minimise the 
potential for disrupting those supply chains. (Paragraph 109)
8. Non-tariff barriers could be equally if not more disruptive to trade in 
agricultural products and food. Products must meet the standards of the 
EU market in order to enter it. If UK and EU regulatory frameworks begin 
to differ after Brexit, there is a risk of substantial non-tariff barriers for agri-
food producers. The greater this divergence, the greater the need for customs 
checks and certification of products and production facilities. This could be 
costly and time consuming for UK farmers and food manufacturers wishing 
to export to the EU. (Paragraph 110)
9. In our report Brexit: trade in goods we urged the Government “to maintain 
close dialogue with the EU over the development of UK and EU standards 
post-Brexit, to avoid unnecessary divergence.” We endorse and re-state this 
recommendation. (Paragraph 111)
10. Customs procedures and associated delays would have a particularly strong 
negative impact on the agri-food sector, where products are often perishable 
and food supply chains are highly integrated across the UK and the EU. 
(Paragraph 112)
11. Agri-food supply chains are particularly highly integrated between Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The re-introduction of border controls 
and tariffs could severely disrupt this industry, and could lead to an increase 
in cross-border smuggling. We therefore repeat the recommendation made 
in our report on Brexit: UK-Irish relations that the Government should make 
every effort to avoid the re-introduction of customs controls on the Irish land 
border. (Paragraph 113)
New market opportunities
12. The EU is the UK’s biggest trading partner for agricultural and food 
products. The evidence suggests that, for a considerable period of time, it will 
not be possible to off-set this trade by increased trade with third countries or 
by expansion of domestic markets. (Paragraph 146)
13. As an EU Member State, the UK has access to preferential trade agreements 
with a number of third countries. As we have concluded in successive 
reports, we doubt that UK participation in these agreements can be 
preserved after Brexit. It is essential therefore that the Government should, 
as a matter of urgency, clarify whether or not such agreements could indeed 
be grandfathered to preserve preferential trade arrangements for agri-food 
products. (Paragraph 147)
14. Our witnesses were concerned that increased trade with third countries that 
operate different—often less stringent—regulatory standards than the UK 
could render UK producers uncompetitive in the domestic market due to 
an influx of cheaper products produced to lower standards. (Paragraph 148)
15. It could also lead to increased pressure on the Government to reduce 
standards domestically in order to lower the cost of production and increase 
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price competitiveness. Yet we note that UK producers are proud of their 
high standards, and that our witnesses questioned whether consumers would 
welcome such a downward trend in current standards. (Paragraph 149)
16. In looking to expand trade in the longer term with third countries, such as 
China, we also heard that high standards were crucial to the British brand. 
The Government should therefore maintain the current standards to enable 
the export of UK food and farming products. (Paragraph 150)
17. We welcome the Government’s commitment to maintaining high levels 
of animal welfare in the UK. There is some doubt over whether animal 
welfare can be used as a rationale to restrict imports from other countries 
under WTO rules. However, we encourage the Government to secure the 
inclusion of high farm animal welfare standards in any free trade agreements 
it negotiates after Brexit. (Paragraph 151)
18. In developing new trading relations with the EU and the world, the 
Government will need to balance the sometimes conflicting needs and 
expectations of farmers, consumers and trading partners with respect to 
quality and costs. (Paragraph 152)
19. It may be hard to reconcile the Government’s wish for the UK to become a 
global leader in free trade with its desire to maintain high quality standards 
for agri-food products within the UK. Striking this balance will require 
extensive consultation with both industry and stakeholders. We note that it 
will be challenging to complete such a consultation in the two-year period 
set out by Article 50. (Paragraph 153)
Transitional arrangements
20. Despite the regulatory conformity between the UK and the EU, there is 
broad consensus among experts—including those on the EU side—that it 
will not be possible to negotiate and conclude a comprehensive free trade 
agreement with the EU within two years. It is therefore essential that the 
Government should agree transitional arrangements with the EU, in order 
to mitigate the potentially disastrous effects of trading on WTO terms on the 
agricultural and food sectors. (Paragraph 156)
21. In our report on Brexit: trade in goods we concluded that it was “critical that 
the Government considers negotiating access to the EU’s preferential trade 
arrangements with third countries for a transitional period”. We reiterate 
that conclusion: the fact that the UK may not be able to grandfather existing 
FTAs with third countries makes it all the more important, particularly to the 
agri-food sector, that there should be a phased transition, so as to allow time 
for the UK to negotiate new FTAs with third countries. (Paragraph 157)
The regulatory framework
Potential improvements
22. Brexit presents a new and important opportunity to replace elements of EU 
agricultural regulation that are bureaucratic, ineffective or ill-tailored to 
farming conditions in the UK, for example the three-crop rule and farming 
by calendar dates. (Paragraph 174)
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23. Any regulatory change will have to strike a balance between managing 
international obligations, consumer and public demands, costs for producers, 
and the conditions of any trade agreements. (Paragraph 175)
24. Significant divergence between the regulatory frameworks in the UK and the 
EU, by creating non-tariff barriers, could make it more difficult to continue 
to trade agri-food products after Brexit. As we noted in our report Brexit: 
trade in goods, an FTA with the EU is likely to require a legal commitment 
by the UK to maintain a high level of harmonisation or mutual recognition 
of regulations and standards with the EU. The scope for deregulation, while 
not negligible, may therefore be limited. (Paragraph 176)
Devolution
25. Farming landscapes vary significantly across the UK, and agriculture is rightly 
a devolved policy area. Though implementation of CAP policies already 
varies, Brexit will allow the devolved administrations to tailor agriculture 
policies even more closely to their farmers and land. (Paragraph 189)
26. But the UK has an internal single market, in which agri-food plays a significant 
role. It is in the interest of all in the agri-food sector, as well as of consumers, 
that the integrity of the UK market be preserved. This will require either a 
UK-wide framework or the negotiation of co-ordinated agricultural policies 
by the UK Government and the Devolved Administrations. We encourage 
the Government to pursue dialogue on this issue as a matter of urgency. 
(Paragraph 190)
27. Trade policy is a reserved matter, so the sum of agricultural policy across 
the UK must respect the UK’s external trade commitments. The UK 
Government will need to work closely with the Devolved Administrations to 
ensure that this is the case. (Paragraph 191)
Regulatory transfer
28. We heard strong support for the Government’s approach of an initial transfer 
of EU agri-food regulations into UK law via the Great Repeal Bill, followed 
by a considered review of where improvements could be made. (Paragraph 
200)
29. We welcome the groundwork already completed in relation to transferring 
EU legislation on animal welfare and plant health into UK law, and invite 
the Government to confirm that the same process will soon be completed in 
relation to other aspects of agricultural legislation. (Paragraph 201)
Institutional governance
30. EU agricultural regulation is underpinned by European institutions that 
monitor and enforce much of the legislative framework and international 
commitments. The Government will need to either ensure that these 
institutions’ roles can be carried out by independent domestic bodies, or 
negotiate enduring relationships with the EU agencies and entities to ensure 
high standards of food safety and quality after Brexit. (Paragraph 207)
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Withdrawing from CAP financial support
Funding in the context of Brexit
31. Many farmers rely on Pillar I and II funding to keep their businesses viable, 
and any substantial reductions in the level of support would have a significant 
impact on both the agriculture sector and the wider rural economy. The 
Government should clarify its intentions regarding financial support post-
2020 as soon as possible to provide the certainty required to make investment 
decisions. (Paragraph 237)
32. Brexit provides an opportunity for the Government to evaluate not only 
the level, but the objectives and structure of financial support to farmers, 
and to design simpler support schemes which are effective in the context 
of UK agriculture. We note that this could include support for the rural 
economy or those in less favoured areas (such as hill farmers), for investment 
in technology to improve productivity, for environmental protection, or 
to ensure UK farmers are not at a competitive disadvantage compared to 
their EU counterparts. We encourage the Government carefully to review 
the needs of the agricultural sectors across the UK, and to consult with 
the industry, to ensure that any future support is targeted and effective. 
(Paragraph 238)
33. There is a case for continuing to provide financial support to farmers after 2020 
to correct market failures and deliver public goods, such as environmental 
protection and ecosystems services, which would not otherwise be paid for. 
We welcome the Minister’s support for this position. (Paragraph 239)
34. Nevertheless, we recognise that agriculture will be competing with many 
other sectors for public expenditure. The agricultural sector will have to 
make a strong case to maintain financial support at the same or similar levels 
to that provided under the CAP. (Paragraph 240)
35. WTO rules may hinder the design of support schemes tailored to UK 
objectives. The Government should factor these constraints into its post-
Brexit agriculture policy, and negotiate a share of the EU’s Amber Box 
allowance to maximise its options for designing an effective post-CAP 
support scheme. It should also consider how to support the provision of 
public goods through agriculture in the event it does not secure such a share. 
(Paragraph 241)
Funding and devolution
36. Farmers in the devolved nations are proportionally heavily dependent on the 
financial support provided by the CAP. Funding mechanisms post-Brexit, 
while ensuring that farmers across the UK continue to receive the support 
necessary to keep their industry productive and sustainable, will need to 
avoid distorting the UK’s internal agri-food market. (Paragraph 246)
Funding transition
37. Farmers will need a transitional period in order to adjust to any new financial 
support scheme, and to provide the certainty they need to invest and adjust 
their business practices. The duration of the transitional period should be 
based on consultation with the industry and reflect the magnitude of change 
being implemented. (Paragraph 251)
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Access to labour
Scale and scope of EU labour
38. Many workers in the agricultural sector are often regarded as ‘unskilled’, but 
are in fact extremely skilled at sector-specific tasks such as crop handling 
and harvesting. We recommend that the Government recognise these skills 
when assessing labour needs and access to foreign labour after Brexit. We 
also welcome the Minister’s recognition that continued access to EU labour 
should be based on an assessment of the needs of the industry, rather than a 
simplistic distinction between skilled and unskilled labour. (Paragraph 264)
39. UK agriculture and food sectors are highly dependent on access to not only 
seasonal, but also permanent, skilled and unskilled (in terms of education 
level) workers from the rest of the EU. The entire food supply chain will be 
adversely affected by any loss of access to that labour pool. (Paragraph 265)
40. We particularly bring to the Government’s attention the overwhelming 
reliance of the sector on EU citizens providing veterinary services in 
abattoirs, which are essential to ensure compliance with food standards and 
regulations. (Paragraph 266)
41. The evidence we heard suggests the agricultural sector is already struggling 
to fill vacant positions and that this challenge is being exacerbated by the 
uncertainty surrounding the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. We therefore 
urge the Government to work with farmers and the food processing industry 
and to assist their recruitment efforts. (Paragraph 267)
42. In our report on Brexit: acquired rights we concluded that the longer the future 
of EU nationals in the UK is uncertain, “the less attractive a place to live and 
work the UK will be, and the greater labour market gaps will be”. This risk 
is already materialising in the agri-food sector, and we therefore repeat our 
call for the Government to clarify the rights of these EU nationals to remain 
and work in the UK. (Paragraph 268)
Filling the labour gap
43. In the short term, technology cannot materially reduce the UK’s need 
for EU agricultural labour; nor is there sufficient local labour to address 
the shortfall. Unless arrangements are made to preserve access to labour 
from outside the UK, the agri-food industry will suffer major disruption. 
(Paragraph 275)
44. The UK agri-food supply chain employs both seasonal and permanent EU 
workers, so a seasonal agricultural workers scheme alone, though a priority 
for our witnesses, will not be a sufficient measure for preserving access to 
labour. (Paragraph 276)
Resources
45. UK bodies, such as the food inspection agencies, will need additional 
resources if they are to take on roles currently fulfilled by EU institutions in 
relation to the agri-food sector. One of these new roles will be an inspection 
workforce working in countries with which we have FTAs to ensure the 
upholding of welfare and phytosanitary standards. (Paragraph 284)
46. Defra faces an enormous challenge in repatriating agricultural policy 
alongside fisheries and environmental policy, particularly given the heavy 
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cuts in its budget over recent years. Its role in relation to the agriculture 
sector will also increase significantly. The Department will need significant 
numbers of additional staff, with appropriate expertise. We welcome Defra’s 
use of expertise from its agencies as an interim measure to inform policy 
development ahead of Brexit, but the Department will need to secure 
sufficient long-term resource. (Paragraph 285)
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APPENDIx 3: GLOSSARY
AHDB Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board
AMS Aggregate Measurement of Support
AoA Agreement on Agriculture
BMPA British Meat Processors Association
BPS Basic Payment Scheme
CAP Common Agricultural Policy
CLA Country Land and Business Association
Codex (Alimentarius) Collection of internationally recognised 
standards, codes of practice, guidelines and other 
recommendations regarding food, food production 
and food safety
CPRE Campaign to Protect Rural England
CVO Chief Veterinary Officer
DAERA Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural 
Affairs, Northern Ireland
Defra The Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs
EFRA Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee in 
the House of Commons
EUIPO European Union Intellectual Property Office
FBI Farm Business Income
FDF Food and Drink Federation
FTA Free Trade Agreement
FUW Farmers’ Union of Wales
FVO Food and Veterinary Office
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GIs Geographical Indicators
GVA Gross Value Added
IGD Institute of Grocery Distribution
MFF Multiannual Financial Framework
nabim National Association of British and Irish Flour Millers
NOAH National Office of Animal Health
NFU National Farmers’ Union
OIE World Organisation for Animal Health
PDO Protected Designation of Origin
PGI Protected Geographical Indication
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RSPB Royal Society for the Protection of Birds
RSPCA Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
SAWS Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme
SPS Agreement The Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures
TBT Agreement The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
TFA Tenant Farmers Association
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TRQ Tariff Rate Quota
TSG Traditional Speciality Guaranteed
UAA Utilised Agricultural Area
WTO World Trade Organization
WWF World Wide Fund for Nature
